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Abstract 
In recent years, more papers on private equity performance have emerged, casting light over 
a market that earlier was characterised by privacy and secrecy. Early studies mostly use 
VentureXpert as a data provider, however, data from this provider has been under a lot of 
criticism lately, and new data providers have emerged. In this thesis, we study the performance 
of buyout and venture funds from 1990 to 2008 using a dataset from Preqin. Previous studies 
have mostly focused on IRR or a modification of this metric. We have compared these findings 
with our results and use a widely reported investment multiple to see if there are discrepancies 
that can explain the differences in results. Based on findings from other papers, the dataset is 
of high quality and is less prone to bias compared to datasets previously used in private equity 
research.  
In our study of fund types, we see a general tendency of buyout outperforming venture. We 
have also looked more closely at sequence numbers and see that there is a negative correlation 
between performance and sequence numbers. This suggests that experience is not necessarily 
a contributing factor for good performance. We find indications that past performance may be 
well suited for risk reduction, but is not necessarily indicative for future performance.  
As Preqin has been little used in private equity research, our results contribute to this field by 
showing that Preqin, as a data provider, is well suited for academic research. We also test the 
validity of past research and show that, although the concepts are still valid, an update based 
on newer data points is warranted.  
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1 Introduction 
Despite the relative size and recent booms in private equity it is still, despite academic and 
practitioner research, an asset class shrouded in mystery. By definition, private equity is 
private, and the asset class has been able to keep much information hidden from researchers, 
colleagues, rivals, authorities and the general public. 
The recent changes in legislation has made data collection easier to obtain and there are now 
better, more reliable data sources, than what has historically been the case. Our data is 
provided by Preqin and it displays potential benefits over previously used data. Easier data 
access in combination with the recent rise in popularity of the asset class, has resulted in 
numerous papers trying to ascertain the risks and rewards associated with private equity 
investments. 
Our study focuses mainly on the constituent factors that drive the performance of private 
equity. The study is limited to buyout and venture, and each of them will be analysed both 
separately and in combination. 
Our thesis has the following structure. In section 2, we present the basics of private equity 
followed by a review of past literature on the field. In section 4, we cover some of the main 
theory on private equity performance, and in section 5, we look more closely at the data on 
hand. In the next sections we first present our hypotheses and then explain the methodology 
used. In section 8, we discuss our findings before summarising our results in section 9. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Private Equity 
In theory, the private equity (PE) term refers to a market opposite of the more known public 
market. PE in general covers investment strategies like venture capital, mezzanine, buyout and 
real estate to mention some. In later years, the term is used to refer to “later-stage development 
capital, but mostly buy-outs and buy-ins of established businesses”(Gilligan & Wright, 2014, 
p. 14). We will use the more general interpretation of this term in our thesis, a term covering 
both early and later stage investments. 
Investing in PE is mostly done through PE funds. These funds are run by fund managers, also 
called general partners (GPs), while the funds’ investors are called limited partners (LPs). 
Once a PE fund is created, it starts seeking investors, entering a period called on the road. In 
this period, investors commit money to the fund, entering in to an LP agreement. When enough 
money is raised, the fund is officially closed, and the GPs can start investing. This is true in 
most cases, but there are instances where closed funds have been reopened.  
PE funds have limited lifespans. The first five to six years are most often used to invest, hence 
this period is called an investment period. After investments are made, GPs focus on getting 
the best results possible, often trough strategies like restructuring and active ownership, before 
exiting them. In this last period, no new investments are made, only follow-up investments in 
their portfolio companies. Usually the pre-agreed length of a fund is approximately 10 years, 
with a two-year possible extension. A PE company will in most cases always have a fund in 
the investment period (Gilligan & Wright, 2014). Hence new funds are, on average, created 
every three years (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
The full amount of capital LPs commit to a fund over its lifespan is called committed capital. 
The committed capital is given to a fund on either a fixed schedule or when a fund calls for it. 
This is called a capital call, and the total amount of money available to a fund at any given 
time is called dry powder. If an LP is not able to pay a fund when a capital call comes, it is 
often arranged so that the other LPs must cover this amount (Gilligan & Wright, 2014). The 
contract details are different from fund to fund, but all are stipulated in the investment contract.  
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2.2 Fees 
PE investments do not realise immediate returns, but the costs of running a PE fund start right 
away. Salaries need to be paid and due diligences need to be done. In order to handle these 
costs, LPs pay management fees to GPs. These fees are annual and approximately 2% of 
committed capital, and usually management fees are reduced as a fund exits the investment 
period and starts realising returns.  
Even though management fees are much needed, some argue that they may cause a principal-
agent problem. As a fund grows, so does fees, giving GPs a larger profit independent of fund 
performance (Gilligan & Wright, 2014). 
There is also a second form of compensation for PE funds called carried interest. When a 
fund’s lifetime is over, GPs gain a certain share of the profit after committed capital is paid 
back. 20% carried interest is most common, and usually accounts for a GP’s biggest profit 
(Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). There are several variations of compensations more complex and 
detailed than the ones presented here, but it is not in the essence of this thesis to dissect 
compensation schemes. 
2.3 General Partners 
GPs may refer to a whole company, but may also just refer to a team of individuals within a 
company having responsibility for a particular fund. Their first task is to raise money in order 
to gain capital needed for investing. Once a fund is closed, GPs can start looking for their first 
investments.  
Before investments are made, GPs have to structure financing and negotiate terms in order to 
close a deal. When a deal is finally closed, an investment has to be closely monitored and 
actively managed if necessary/possible. In the end, GPs exit investments, realising their 
returns. We mentioned earlier that there might be some principal-agent problems relating to 
PE. As a preventive factor, most GPs usually invest in the fund themselves. About one per 
cent of a fund’s capital come from GPs, increasing their incentive to perform well (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2011). There is also the carried interest, which is potentially huge for a profitable 
firm. 
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2.4 Limited Partners 
The reason investors are called LPs, is that they have limited liability and thus cannot lose 
more money than they invest. A fund is usually set up as a separate limited life partnership, 
preventing any double taxation, making it more attractive to possible investors. There are a lot 
of different LPs, but pension funds, both public and private, are by far the biggest of them. 
Following pension funds, we find foundations, fund of funds companies, insurance companies 
and endowment plans to mention some (Gilligan & Wright, 2014). 
2.5 Fund Types 
When capital is called, it is time for GPs to start investing. Different funds are classified 
according to the investments they make. Buyout, measured in number of funds, size of deals, 
and size of exits are the biggest fund type in PE (Gilligan & Wright, 2014; Metrick & Yasuda, 
2011). Venture is the second largest, and these two fund types are most researched. 
Buyout funds often take majority control of the companies they invest in, and usually these 
companies are well established. In contrast, venture funds take smaller stakes in companies. 
These companies are often newly started or seen upon as up and coming, making the deals 
smaller than those of buyout funds. However, venture funds may realise bigger returns on 
successful exits. 
2.6 Returns 
The returns and performance of PE funds are measured in many ways. According to Global 
Investment Performance Standards (GIPS), presentations of some measures are mandatory as 
of each annual period end (CFA Institute, 2010): 
● Paid-In capital 
● Distributions 
● Committed Capital 
● Total Value to Paid-In capital (TVPI) 
● Distributions to Paid-In capital (DPI) 
● Paid-In capital (PIC) 
● Residual Value to Paid-In capital (TVPI) 
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● Internal Rate of Return (IRR1) 
 
These latest standards come from 2011, and even though some of these measures are reported 
for funds decades back, secrecy and privacy have been a problem for PE research. Earlier, it 
was not demanded that fair value was used in calculations and many funds were reluctant to 
give up anything but final returns. This secrecy, among other things, has led to an increasing 
number of research papers on PE in the last 10-15 years. 
IRR is perhaps the most popular performance measure. This is the annualised yield of the 
investments’ underlying cash flow. The main advantage of IRR is that it considers timing of 
cash flows. However, the metric does provide some drawbacks that will be illuminated later. 
Other popular performance metrics are investment multiples. PE funds have, even before the 
GIPS requirements, reported multiples. These can, together with IRR, be used to get a better 
understanding of the true returns LPs get from their investments. IRR and multiples are 
complementary and both should be used with caution when reviewing fund performance and 
in comparisons of PE performance. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 All references to IRR is net of fees (Net IRR) unless stated otherwise. 
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3 Litterature Review 
As mentioned, more and more papers on PE have been published in later years. Many of these 
papers focus on whether PE funds perform better than a public market or not. Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2008) find evidence that the S&P 500 outperforms PE, net-of-fees, by 3% per 
year.  Robinson and Sensoy (2011) on the other hand, find evidence of the opposite. Compared 
to the S&P 500, and seen over a fund’s lifetime, buyout funds outperform the index by 18%, 
while venture funds outperform it by 3%. A combination of these results are found in Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005), who reports that buyout funds underperform compared to the public 
market. They also find that venture funds underperform if returns are equally weighted, and 
overperform if returns are weighted by capital. Both Kaplan and Schoar & Phalippou and 
Gottschalg find that PE outperforms the public market gross-of-fees. 
There are several reasons why results differ, but one important factor seems to be the choice 
of dataset. The most common data providers are: 
● Burgiss 
● Cambridge Associates (CA) 
● Preqin 
● VentureXpert/Thomson Reuters/Thomson Venture Economics (VE) 
Earlier papers mostly use VE. Although Preqin and CA have been around for some time, 
Preqin has not been used a lot in PE research (Harris, Jenkinson, & Stucke, 2010). The most 
recent data provider is Burgiss, which have gained popularity among researchers in later years. 
As mentioned, most of the earlier papers, including both Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and 
Phalippou & Gottschalg (2008), use VE. Later research have shown that the VE data has 
several negative features. Stucke (2011) finds that net asset values (NAV) and cash flows were 
not updated for years. NAVs was rolled on for each year, making the numbers going forward 
almost meaningless at the end. These NAVs are for instance used by Phalippou & Gottschalg. 
As a funds maturity increases, IRR will decrease, thus understating returns. This affects 
Kaplan and Schoar, Phalippou and Gottschalg and most other papers based on VE. 
In recent years, several papers have started to evaluate the different datasets, comparing them 
against each other. Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan (2014) show that Preqin, CA and Burgiss have 
more or less the same performance results. They also find evidence suggesting these datasets 
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are unbiased, and hence suitable for academic research. Further, they find similar results for 
VE as Stucke (2011). So do Harris, Jenkinson & Stucke (2010). They compare VE, Preqin and 
CA, but unlike Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan, find big differences in the datasets. The various 
mixes of fund types and small coverages of total funds are a big concern and “Some of these 
differences are not readily explained by random variation and suggest systematic effects 
related to data methods and sample selection” (Harris et al., 2010, p. 24). They also find that 
Preqin usually have higher performance figures, especially for venture in the early 90s. Other 
reasons why results differ may be the research period. Performance in PE is very cyclical, and 
there might be big differences in results (Higson & Stucke, 2012). In addition, different 
definitions or classifications in datasets may have an impact on results. 
Buyout and venture are by far the most researched fund types. In Kaplan & Schoar (2005), 
venture is generally the better performing fund type. Hsu (2004) finds that venture companies 
with a high reputation have a better chance of getting their offers accepted than those with 
lower reputation. In addition, high reputation leads to better deals, increasing chances of higher 
IRRs. While other studies also find that venture outperform buyout, this is only for smaller 
periods (Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014). Looking at the whole sample period, Ljungqvist 
& Richardson (2003), Robinson & Sensoy (2011) and Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan (2014) all 
find better performance for buyout compared to venture. The two latter use a similar sample 
period as we do, making their results comparable to ours.  
There is not a lot of research on how funds are performing depending on whether they are 
raised in a boom or bust period. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find evidence that funds raised in 
periods of high economic growth are less likely to create follow-on funds, implying they 
perform worse than funds raised in bust periods. According to Robinson & Sensoy (2011), 
low performance in PE follows periods with high fundraising. Barber and Yasuda (2014) find 
that when interim performance of a fund is peaking, GPs start fundraising. Typically, one 
would assume this happens towards the middle or end of a boom period, hence fundraising 
will peak close to the next bust period. This could partly explain the results of both Kaplan & 
Schoar and Robinson & Sensoy. 
Comparisons of decades could be helpful in detecting possible changes that the large inflows 
of institutional investors and low cost of capital during the 00s, had on the PE industry 
(Appelbaum & Batt, 2012). As we analyse data up until 2008, we can compare the 90s against 
the 00s. Since we have funds in our dataset that has not yet been liquidated, results of this 
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comparison may be in favour of the 90s. Ljungqvist & Richardson  point out that the average 
IRR of a fund does not turn positive until year eight. Hence, fund performance for the 00s may 
be biased downwards. This theory is also supported by Steer and Ellis (2011). In their study 
of PE valuations, they find that even though interim IRRs can be overstated, they tend to be 
downwardly biased. However, this downward bias becomes insignificant when a fund reaches 
year seven, meaning that there is no systematic evidence of bias in valuations once a fund is 
sufficiently mature. 
Harris,  (2014) report high performance for buyout throughout both decades, but for venture 
funds, performance in the 00s was low. Higson & Stucke (2012) only study buyout funds, but 
find a significant downward trend in performance through vintages. The results of these two 
papers suggest better performance in the 90s compared to the 00s.  
Controlling for fund size, performance vary a lot in different papers. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) 
and Higson & Stucke (2012) find that larger funds perform better than small funds. The former 
also finds that past performance is positively related to capital inflows. Hence, funds will 
generally increase after periods of excessive economic growth, and well-performing GPs will 
tend to raise larger follow-on funds. These findings are consistent with an early study by Sirri 
& Tufano (1998) on mutual funds and more recent studies by Kaplan & Strömberg (2005) and 
Robinson & Sensoy (2011) on PE.  
Further, Robinson & Sensoy (2011) reports lower returns after periods of high fundraising. If 
this effect dominates, we could see smaller funds performing better, resulting in size being 
negatively correlated with returns. This is supported by Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003) and 
Gompers & Lerner (2000). Gompers & Lerner’s results indicate that funds pay a higher price 
for their investments following capital inflows. Thus, chances are that smaller funds will be 
able to outperform larger funds. This may also be one of the reasons why successful GPs 
choose not to increase follow-on fund sizes (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). Hellman & Puri (2002) 
find that GPs focusing on venture can have a good influence on the outcome of the investments 
by using their skills and knowledge. Metrick & Yasuda (2010) agree with this relating to 
venture, and add that buyout is more scalable, implying past performance has different 
implications for different fund types. Higson & Stucke (2012) suggest that larger buyout funds 
may perform better because they get easier access to debt financing, often at more favourable 
terms than smaller funds. 
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While comparisons of fund size and performance are well researched, fewer look at sequence 
number and performance. According to Kaplan & Schoar (2005), first-time funds perform 
worse than later funds, but looking at specific GPs, higher sequence numbers results in lower 
performance. The latter part probably coincides with the fact that high performing funds are 
more likely to have follow-on funds (Chung, Sensoy, Stern, & Weisbach, 2012). Harris, 
Jenkinson, Kaplan, & Stucke (2014) confirm this, but dig even deeper into the differences 
between fund types and decades. GPs with well performing buyout funds pre-2000, seem to 
raise new well-performing funds, but persistence is not found post-2000. For GPs with venture 
funds, persistence is found in both periods. Looking at sequence number and size together, 
Kaplan & Schoar find evidence suggesting that “funds with persistently good performance are 
especially favored in the fund raising process” (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005, p. 21). This implies 
that fund size increases with sequence number as raising new funds are most often done by 
those GPs with already successful funds.  
Metrick & Yasuda (2010) have also taken a closer look at fund size and sequence numbers. 
They find that for buyout funds, GPs with experience increase the fund size sharply even 
though they know this will result in worse performance. Larger funds result in higher fees, 
which again results in higher GP income. They actually reduce chances of raising more follow-
on funds in favour of short-term income by making their next fund larger. As mentioned 
earlier, this might be easier with buyout funds as they are more scalable than venture funds. 
Such behaviour may cause principal-agent problems, where GPs favour higher fees at the 
expense of LP profitability. They do not find similar returns for venture funds. 
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4 Theory 
4.1 Performance Metrics 
4.1.1 Multiples 
Depending on the multiple, and how it is calculated, unrealised returns may be included. There 
are uncertainty regarding these multiples, which is especially true for figures reported by GPs 
before the introduction of GIPS private equity provisions. These standards have clear 
definitions of multiple reporting, which make them better for comparisons. 
4.1.1.1 Distributions to Paid-In capital 
DPI is a realisation multiple that provides additional information as to how much of the return 
that has actually been realised and distributed to LPs. DPI is given by: 
 
𝐷𝑃𝐼 =
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
(1) 
In a fund’s early life, this multiple is typically zero since there has been no realisations yet. 
However, it will grow over a fund’s life. This metric may be very volatile towards the end, as 
a fund may call on more capital to reinvest in portfolio companies before exit. When a fund’s 
DPI equals one, this is the LPs brake-even point. However, DPI is presented in nominal terms 
since time value of money is not factored in. 
DPI and TVPI are the same after a fund has been liquidated and can be an important multiple 
in comparing PE firms. It gives a measure of how much is actually realised, and in the end 
realised returns are what matters. 
4.1.1.2 Residual Value to Paid-In capital 
GIPS private equity provisions also require the presentation of RVPI. RVPI is a measure on 
how much of the return is unrealised, and is the counterpoint to DPI. As a fund matures, RVPI 
will increase to a peak, and eventually decrease to a residual market value of zero when a fund 
is liquidated. At this point, the entire return of the fund has been distributed. 
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𝑅𝑉𝑃𝐼 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝐼𝑛  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
(2) 
This metric is subjective as there are multiple ways a fund can calculate the value of unrealised 
returns. The guidelines provide a broad foundation for valuing assets, and aim to improve 
comparability between GPs. They recommend a concept of fair value, which is the amount an 
asset could be sold for or acquired by, in a transaction between willing and unrelated parties. 
It is an estimate of likely exchange price and does involve subjective judgements. Hence, there 
is a potential to manipulate these numbers. 
However, research on UK venture and PE valuations, suggests that there is little sign of 
upwards systematic bias in interim valuations of unrealised returns. This might suggest that 
RVPI is useful when combined with DPI in evaluations of PE performance (Steer & Ellis, 
2011). 
4.1.1.3 Total Value to Paid-In capital 
The standards require funds to report TVPI. This multiple is also known as an investment 
multiple and is the sum of DPI and RVPI. It is also given by: 
 
𝑇𝑉𝑃𝐼 =
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑  𝐼𝑛  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
(3) 
The metric gives an overall performance of a PE fund and is the most used multiple of return. 
For relatively young funds, and inexperienced GPs, TVPI might be highly uncertain. 
4.1.2 Drawbacks of multiples 
The biggest and most obvious drawback of using multiples, is that they do not take into 
consideration the timing of capital calls and distributions, nor does it take into consideration 
time value of money. Even though these metrics are relatively easy to understand, without the 
time dimension, one could get the same results by putting money in the bank and waiting. 
Therefore, time dimension is a critical factor when comparing actual fund performance. 
If multiples are to be used, they should be accompanied by cash flow data as well as forecasts 
on when capital calls and distributions will occur. These forecasts would be difficult to 
produce, and even more so for young funds, and funds run by inexperienced GPs. Such a 
forecast would thus be unreliable.  
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Based on these drawbacks, multiple comparisons need to rely on fairly strong and general 
assumptions regarding calls and distributions. These assumptions are too stringent to be used 
in comparisons of funds on a fund-by-fund basis. However, they could be used in comparing 
different investment strategies, like industry focus, region focus or type of fund. In this setting, 
it is possible to make more general assumptions regarding PE cash flow cycles, since they on 
average follow similar pay-in and distribution cycles. From this, it is possible to construct an 
equivalent public market investment vehicle and compare strategies to this portfolio. 
4.1.2.1 Peer Group Comparison 
Example 
 
Figure 1 - Comparing PE Multiples and an S&P500 Investment Vehicle 
In the above graph, we have compared average TVPIs to the return LPs would have gotten if 
they used a similar S&P500 investment vehicle. These weights emulates the percentage of 
committed capital normally tied up in PE investments. 
 
𝑆&𝑃 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 = ∏ 1 + (𝐴𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆&𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 × 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
  
 
(4) 
From the graph, we see that PE in general outperforms public equity, except in the period from 
1989 to 1993. This is a broad statement, and is sensitive to the chosen weights of the S&P500 
Fund Cycle 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 8th year 9th year 10th year
Weights 10 % 40 % 70 % 90 % 90 % 90 % 90 % 60 % 40 % 20 %
 0,0
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 1,0
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 2,5
 3,0
 3,5
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Investment Multiple
Buyout Venture Other All S&P 500
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investment vehicle. Therefore the amount of under or over performance can be altered 
drastically. However, the trend is less affected by changes in weights and we can see that there 
is some correlation between PE returns and public equity returns. This correlation is arguably 
not causal. Both returns probably rely on some other unobserved factor that influences the 
return of both PE investments and public stock market investments. 
Since the norm in evaluating PE funds is peer group comparisons, these peer groups can take 
on any form an LP chooses. They will in general include vintage, fund type and area of focus 
(either geographic, industry or both). PE data providers will often let investors create custom 
benchmarks in order to compare performance of funds that are in line with their own 
investment strategy more accurately. 
Because peer group comparisons are the norm, a comparison of buyout, venture or other types 
of PE funds, should be compared to a public index that more closely resembles the types of 
companies a fund is likely to invest in. It would therefore be better to use an index like Nasdaq 
Small-Cap or Russell 2000® to compare venture returns to public market returns. A 
comparison with the Dow Jones Large-Cap index or the MSCI USA Large-Cap index might 
be a better basis for comparing buyout returns to that of public equity. 
4.1.3 Internal Rate of Return 
IRR is the most widely used PE performance metric. It is also used in the evaluation of other 
forms of corporate investments. LPs and other corporate investors are familiar with this 
performance metric, and this might be a part of the reason for its widespread success. The IRR 
also facilitates easy comparison between investing in PE and investing in other corporate 
projects, however, it is not easily comparable to the returns gained from public equity investing 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005).  
Another important reason for the success of IRR is that it, in contrast to multiples, takes into 
consideration the timing of cash flows. In its theoretical form, IRR is the discount rate ensuring 
that the net present value of cash flows is zero. The GIPS (CFA Institute, 2010) propose this 
calculation of interim return measurement: 
 
0 = ∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑖 (1 +
𝑟
𝑐
)
−(𝑖𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=0
 
 
(5) 
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Where 𝐶𝐹 is the cash flow for period 𝑖, 𝑛 is the total number of cash flows, 𝑖 is the cashflow 
period, 𝑐 is the number of annual cash flow sub periods, and 𝑟 is the sub period IRR. 
The IRR favours early cash flows and thus hinders GPs accumulating capital at the beginning 
of a fund’s life. It also incentivises GPs to distribute proceeds quickly after they have been 
realised. There are numerous pitfalls when comparing fund performance based on IRR, some 
of which are also evident in evaluating corporate projects. LPs need to be aware of these before 
an investment decision is made. Because of these pitfalls IRR has been criticised by a number 
of papers (Higson & Stucke, 2012; Phalippou, 2008), and the main pitfalls are outlined below. 
4.1.3.1 Aggregation issues 
A problem with using IRR is that the average is different from the aggregated cash flows. This 
can potentially be a big problem in comparing PE returns since a fund’s IRR is negatively 
related to duration, meaning the average performance is usually upwardly biased. Difficulties 
may arise when comparing funds based on an industry average, or by other characteristics like 
fund type or size. Because of the duration issues, funds with longer duration will usually 
underperform based on an average IRR comparison.  
There might be underlying factors that results in some fund types having consistently lower 
duration than others. This could lead us to wrongly conclude that they outperform other types 
of funds. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) suggest that a weighting based on duration might 
be a step in the right direction. However, this requires cash flow data. A duration weighting 
seems like an intuitive correction and means that funds with different timing of cash flows 
will be treated differently.  
If cash flow data is not available, we need another way of detecting differences in timing of 
cash flows. A comparison of TVPI and IRR is therefore used in our thesis. We would expect 
TVPI and IRR to behave similarly if the cash flows on average have similar durations and 
timing of calls and distributions.  
4.1.3.2 Endogenous Cash Flows 
The problem with endogenous cash flows is that it provides GPs with incentives to 
strategically time calls and distributions. By waiting to draw down capital from LPs, as 
opposed to requiring payment upfront, GPs are able to minimise the time element, and 
therefore allows them to maximise IRR. Thus, GPs have the ability to game their cash flows. 
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Since IRR is biased, and favours early cash flows, this incentivises GPs to get out of good 
investments early, and hold on to bad investments longer. 
Buyout funds have been criticised for buying a company, borrow large amounts of capital with 
the company’s assets as collateral, and using the borrowed money to pay out large dividends. 
Another criticised practice that is quite common is to take a company public and distribute 
shares directly to LPs. Both of these practises are in line whit the attempt to maximize IRRs 
(Hall, 2006). 
Although there is now proof that inflating IRR is the reason behind these practices, buyout 
firms have been called “evil empires”. In the 1980s, managers like T. Boone Pickens and Carl 
Icahn became infamous for buying companies and streamlining production by selling of large 
amounts of assets to increase exit multiples, and hence a company’s valuation (Cendrowski, 
Petro, Martin, & Wadecki, 2012, p. 165). 
4.1.3.3 Reinvestment Assumption 
The IRR equals the effective rate of return only if intermediate cash flows distributed by the 
PE fund can be reinvested in other opportunities at the same rate. If the IRR is high, the spread 
between IRR and effective rate of return is positive and large. If the IRR is low, the spread is 
negative and large. Concequently, funds with a high IRR have an IRR greater than the effective 
rate of return, with the opposite being true for funds with a low IRR.  
Based on this, and the volatility of intermediate cash flows, IRR can be misleading. Results 
therefore show a more dispersed performance figure than what might actually the case. 
4.1.3.4 Valuation risk 
During a fund’s life, IRRs are calculated by taking into account the unrealised value of 
investments. This is in line with the calculations of RVPI in the PE multiples case, which 
means that the interim estimates of IRR must be based on expected future cash flows. The GPs 
consequently have a potential to manipulate results and overstate expected returns on exits. 
This problem is reduced as a fund matures, partly because GPs have more information 
regarding their own portfolio companies, and partly because the closer a fund gets to 
liquidation, the less impact cash flows have. 
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To take the unrealised value of investments into consideration, NAV is used. The NAV is 
mostly used for public companies and is the assets less liabilities, divided by outstanding 
shares. In the case of PE, the expected present discounted sum of future cash flows is one way 
NAV is calculated. The British Venture Capital association, one of the associations that helped 
form the GIPS guidelines, presents this method of calculating NAV (GIPS, 2006; Steer & 
Ellis, 2011). 
 
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖 ∑ 𝛽
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑗
𝐶𝐹𝑖 
 
(6) 
Where 𝛽 is the discount rate, 𝑖 is the period and N is the number of periods. 
Because there is some subjectivity present in estimating both the discount factor and the future 
cash flows, uncertainty around interim IRRs for firms that are not yet liquidated arises. This 
also makes it possible to, either deliberately, or by accident, over or understate NAV. 
4.1.4 Real World Cash Flow, IRR and TVPI Example 
An example of the potential weakness of IRR is the case of Example Partners and their fund I 
and II2.  The funds show IRRs of 218.3% and 514.3%, respectively. A closer look at the funds’ 
cash flow data, reveal huge distributions in the funds’ early years, with marginal distributions 
later in time. This gives the funds an effective lifespan of 11 years, however, most distributions 
happen in the early years. 
                                                 
2 The funds in this example are real, and are collected from Preqin’s database, but due to confidentiality, the names have been 
changed.  
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Figure 2 – Example Partners I – Cash Flow Illustration 
   
Figure 3 – Example Partners II – Cash Flow Illustration 
There is no denying that Example Partners has been extremely successful, returning around 
20 times the initial investments of LPs in both funds. What is evident from the cash flows is 
that both funds return roughly the same multiple, but because of the timing of distributions, 
fund I displays an IRR that is less than half of fund II. Both funds have similar distributions 
from 1998 and onwards with the bulk being distributed before the collapse of the dot-com 
bubble. Because fund I started calling on capital three years earlier than fund II, the IRR is 
substantially smaller, and clearly shows that IRR is negatively correlated with a funds 
duration.  
Example Partners I - Cash Flow Data
Vintage 1995 Size 125
IRR 218,3
TVPI 20,51
Date Called % DPI % IRR
1995 15,0 0 n/m
1996 45,0 145,16 n/m
1997 84,7 108,65 n/a
1998 100,0 137,33 n/a
1999 100,0 358,01 214,6
2000 100,0 1997,17 218,4
2001 100,0 2024,18 218,3
2002 100,0 2024,19 218,3
2003 100,0 2045,13 218,3
2004 100,0 2015,13 218,3
2005 100,0 2045,13 218,3
2006 100,0 2051,10 218,3
Example Partners II - Cash Flow Data
Vintage 1998 Size 200
IRR 514,3
TVPI 19,86
Date Called % DPI % IRR
1998 30,1 0 n/m
1999 80,0 65,39 n/m
2000 87,5 1786,50 n/a
2001 100,0 1961,68 515,6
2002 100,0 1964,20 515,0
2003 100,0 1964,20 515,0
2004 100,0 1982,45 515,0
2005 100,0 1982,45 515,0
2006 100,0 1982,45 515,0
2007 100,0 1982,45 515,0
2008 100,0 1982,45 515,0
2009 100,0 1986,22 514,3
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In the case of aggregation issues, both funds have a much larger IRR and TVPI than the other 
funds with the same vintage. These funds will skew the average IRR severely if such a measure 
is used. If cash flow data is available, a duration weighted benchmark, as proposed by 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) would be a better measure. 
If cash flow data is not available, the use of median IRRs or an average, which excludes 
extreme values, will also mitigate the outlier problem. In the statistical analyses, we have used 
one dataset based on median IRRs, and another dataset based on mean IRR excluding extreme 
values. 
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5 Data 
This thesis is based on a dataset from Preqin. Preqin gets their data in several different ways, 
the main sources being GPs, LPs and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Also, 
regulatory filings and monitoring of media outlets provide useful data. Direct correspondence 
with Preqin tells that GPs provide 60% of the performance data (Harris et al., 2010). FOIA is 
mostly used if fiduciary responsibilities do not allow for disclosures.  
Preqin has been researching the PE industry for over a decade. According to our Preqin 
contact, the data is trusted by the most respected alternative asset media outlets like 
Bloomberg, Financial Times and Wall Street Journal amongst others (J. Kimble, personal 
communication, May 13, 2015). These media outlets are known to have the highest quality 
data on the market and are heavily relied on by the largest global banks, fund managers, 
investors and law firms. As of the 1st of May 2015, Preqin covers 20 448 PE firms, 43 073 
funds, 19 995 funds with performance data, 6 004 funds with IRR data and claims to have the 
best market coverage (Preqin, 2015).  
Harris, Jenkinson, & Stucke (2010) point out that GPs may not be incentivised to provide IRR, 
but Preqin themselves claims to have the best net to LP performance data (Preqin, 2008). 
However, when research relies on voluntary submission of data, there could be a problem with 
survivorship and backfill bias. Survivorship bias occurs when poor performing funds stop 
reporting results and falls out of calculations. Backfill bias occur when funds stall their 
performance reporting only to backfill them when better results have been achieved. 
According to Russel (Gupta, 2012) and Preqin, there seem to be no survivorship bias in 
Preqin’s dataset, but Harris, Jenkinson, & Stucke state that it could suffer from backfill bias. 
The reliability of IRR is often questioned when analysing performance data. We will discuss 
the benefits and disadvantages of IRR later, but we would like to quote what Preqin had to say 
about their own IRR calculations: 
The IRR is extremely reliable whether the fund is liquidated or not. When we 
calculate it ourselves we use the cash flow data to get an accurate calculation. 
For the firms that just report IRR, we not only benchmark them against their 
industry to ensure performance is in line but we also contact investors to make 
sure we are getting accurate information (J. Kimble, personal communication, 
May 13, 2015).  
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5.1 Data Processing 
The original dataset contained records of 22 048 PE funds. Many of these funds had missing 
data and editing needed to be done.  
First, the sizes of the funds were in nominal terms, so we adjusted them for inflation (Bureau 
of Labor statistics, 2015).All fund sizes are now presented in 2008 dollars. 
Second, we limited our data to funds with vintage between 1990 and 2008. There are few 
observations in the dataset before the 90s, so in order to get proper measures for decades, we 
chose to start at 1990. The reasoning behind the 2008 cut-off relies on a few factors. Possibly, 
the best data would come from already liquidated funds. Using liquidated funds may be more 
reliable as the numbers going forward are actually realised. However, by only accepting 
liquidated funds into the dataset, we would have reduced the dataset by approximately ⅔, 
leaving us with too few observations to make any meaningful inferences. Ljungqvist & 
Richardson (2003) and Steer & Ellis (2011) find that there are no systematic bias when a fund 
is sufficiently mature, hence we include observations up until 2008.  
Third, we only kept funds with both focus and GP location in the US. By doing this, we avoid 
possible problems like difference in legislation or other governing factors between countries 
and regions. 
Fourth, we dropped all the funds that either had missing data for IRR, size or TVPI. We assume 
that the data missing is not due to some underlying characteristics and therefore dropping them 
will not create any bias. 
Fifth, only buyout and venture funds were kept. There were many different fund types in the 
original sample, but due too few observations for all but buyout, venture and real estate, these 
were dropped. Most PE research have focused on either buyout, venture or both of them, 
making this study more comparable to previous work. We have also found that there is no 
significant differences in distributions between the performance of real estate and the 
performance of buyout and venture combined. Hence, real estate was dropped, too. 
After having dropped the necessary data, a sample of 786 PE funds were left. In the analysis 
later on, we are going to run two different tests depending on different sample characteristics. 
The student’s t-test for two independent samples (t-test) is used to compares means, while the 
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Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test (MWW-test) is used to compares medians. When comparing 
medians, the sample containing 786 funds is sufficient, and we call this sample the untrimmed 
dataset. However, when comparing means, the results tend to be upwardly biased because of 
aggregation issues. We reduce this problem by cutting the top and bottom 2.5% for IRR, size 
and TVPI. By doing this we drop 118 observations, ending up with a sample of 668 PE funds. 
We call this sample the trimmed dataset. As we will use the t-test in most of the analysis, the 
descriptive statistics will rely on the trimmed dataset. For descriptive statistics on the 
untrimmed dataset, see Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics 
for Untrimmed Dataset. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The mean3 IRR (size)4 [TVPI]5 of the sample is 9.73% ($403M) [1.56]. Table 3,Table 4 
andTable 5 in Appendix A show the whole descriptive statistics for the trimmed dataset for 
IRR, size and TVPI, respectively. As seen in these tables, we control for some specific factors, 
including fund types, cycles, decades, sizes and sequence numbers. 
5.2.1 Fund Types 
The first factor we control for is fund types. As mentioned, only buyout and venture funds are 
present in the sample. There are 271 buyout funds and 397 venture funds, making the sample 
fairly well distributed. Buyout (venture) funds have an IRR of 13.32% (7.27%), a size of 
$545M ($306M) and a TVPI of 1.77 (1.42). 
5.2.2 Cycles 
Secondly, we control for business cycles. We have divided the business cycle into boom and 
bust periods. Some papers control for these periods, but few, if any, mention the specific time 
periods of these cycles. Kaplan & Strömberg (2008) are speaking of buyout booms in the late 
80s, early 90s and between 2005 and mid-2007. They also state that a boom can only happen 
when earnings yield (S&P 500 companies in this case) exceeds interest rates on high-yield 
                                                 
3
 Unless specified otherwise, future mentions of numbers relating to IRR, size or TVPI will always be in mean.  
4
 Unless specified otherwise, all numbers mentioned in parentheses during the rest of this section will be size 
numbers  
5
 Unless specified otherwise, all numbers mentioned in brackets during the rest of section 4 will be TVPI numbers 
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bonds. This is not sufficient though, and other condition also need to be met in order to 
experience a boom. Acharya, Franks, & Servaes (2007) speak about boom and bust periods, 
too, but they only look at buyout as well. According to them, the buyout boom in the 00s lasted 
from 2001-2006. However, none of them explain the criteria for defining these periods.  
We classify each individual year in the sample as either boom or bust, where bust is a year 
containing at least six months of a recession. Looking at the recessions between 1990-2008 
(the National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015), 1990, 2001 and 2008 are considered bust 
periods in our sample. The rest is classified as boom. Since the records only keep track of 
funds’ vintages and not the specific dates they are raised, this is about as precise as the 
classification can get. A fund started in January 1991 is in principal started during a recession, 
but as the recession ended in March 1991, this year has been classified as boom, and thus the 
fund is classified as boom, too. Some funds will therefore have similar characteristics, but will 
be classified differently. Counting observations, boom and bust have 567 and 101, 
respectively. Hence, problems will arise later on, concerning too few observations in bust 
periods. When controlling for sequence numbers and bust simultaneously, the possibility of 
getting insignificant results improves. The IRR of boom funds is 9.18% ($406M) [1.53], while 
the IRR for bust funds is 12.76% ($386M) [1.71]. 
5.2.3 Decades 
Thirdly, we control for decades. As the sample stretches from 1990-2008, we classify them as 
either 90s (1990-1999) or 00s (2000-2008). We have an overweight of funds in the 00s, 
counting 376 observations in this decade compared to 292 in the 90s. The 90s have an IRR of 
12.11% ($390M) [1.65] while the 00s have an IRR of 7.87% ($413M) [1.49]. 
5.2.4 Size 
Fourthly, we control for size. To do this, we classify all the funds smaller than $100M as small. 
Funds equal to or larger than $100M, but smaller than $500M, are classified as medium, while 
funds with a size of $500M and above, are classified as large. By doing this, small funds will 
be dominated by venture while buyout will dominate large. This is much due to the nature of 
these fund types, as discussed earlier. Looking at observations, small, medium and large count 
127, 360 and 181, respectively. The IRR of small funds is 10.68% ($58M) [1.59] while the 
equivalent measure for medium and large is 9.85% ($259M) [1.59] and 8.82% ($931M) [1.47], 
respectively. 
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5.2.5 Sequence Numbers 
Last, we control for sequence numbers. We have divided the funds into classifications as 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Sequence Number Classifications 
The classification of sequence numbers was done before any data was dropped. To show why 
we did this and how the classification works, we will use an example containing the imaginary 
funds in Table 2. 
Example 
As we can see, Imag PE Partners started their PE business in 1986. In 1991 they created their 
second fund (Imag Buyout I), which meant that the first fund had a follow-on fund. Hence, 
Imag Venture I was classified as 1 and not 0. Also, two more funds were created in 1991, Imag 
Venture II and Imag Buyout II. These are also classified as sequence number 2. In our opinion, 
there is one upside and one downside to this. The downside is that Imag Buyout I and II will 
both have the same sequence number. Although we do not have the exact dates these funds 
were raised, it seems obvious that Imag Buyout I was created before Imag Buyout II. The 
upside is that we may capture more of the sequence number characteristics this way. GPs tend, 
on average, to create a fund every three years. If a GP’s sequence number 2, 3 and 4 were 
created in the same year, it would be difficult to capture size effects. LPs who invest in Imag 
Buyout II will not be aware of the performance of Imag Buyout I. We look at this upside as 
bigger than the downside, and hence classify all funds created in the same year with the same 
sequence number. Finally, the two last funds of Imag PE Partners are both sequence number 
4, as sequence number 4 contains a GP’s sequence number 4 or above. This is why ⅓ of the 
observations belong to sequence number 4. For descriptive statistics on sequence numbers, 
see Appendix A. 
SN Explanation
0&1 A firm's first fund
0 A firm's first fund, but no follow-on fund has been created
1 A firm's first fund, and at least one follow-on fund has been created
2 A firm's second fund
3 A firm's third fund
4 A firm's fourth fund or more
Sequence Number (SN) Classifications
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Table 2 - Classification of Sequence Number 
5.3 Quartile Data 
Past GP performance is widely used by LPs when picking funds to invest in. A fund’s 
performance is therefore often accompanied by its quartile rank. This rank is established by 
comparing the fund’s IRR with the IRR of similar funds. Preqin’s default metric for computing 
the benchmark IRR, is a median of funds from the same vintage, same fund type and funds 
focusing on the same location or region. These characteristics cannot be upheld in all cases. 
Depending on the information available, the number of funds in a peer group or an investor’s 
preference, these can be changed to better reflect performance, and to make portfolio 
comparisons possible.  
In our dataset, we have included Preqin’s default benchmarks. We then looked at GPs which 
had funds in a previous vintage, and linked the performance data of the previous fund to the 
next fund they raised.  
In 2014, Preqin published a press release announcing the most consistent performing GPs 
(Preqin, 2014). They looked at the last three funds a GP had, which had a similar investment 
strategy. Preqin used their own quartile ranks based on both TVPI and IRR. This should make 
gaming of quartile rank more difficult and therefore make the rankings more robust than those 
of for example VE. 
Firm Name Fund Name Vintage Sequence Number In sample
Imag PE Partners Imag Venture I 1986 1 No
Imag PE Partners Imag Buyout I 1991 2 Yes
Imag PE Partners Imag Venture II 1991 2 Yes
Imag PE Partners Imag Buyout II 1991 2 Yes
Imag PE Partners Imag Venture III 1995 3 Yes
Imag PE Partners Imag Venture IV 2003 4 Yes
Imag PE Partners Imag Venture V 2009 4 No
Imag PE Partners Fund History
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6 Hypotheses 
In the analysis, we will compare fund characteristics against each other to check if some of 
them are significantly different. The hypotheses are based on previous research, and our own 
subjective opinions. 
6.1 IRR and TVPI 
Both IRR and TVPI are performance metrics and should not show very different results, unless 
there are some other underlying factors that need special attention. Hence, our hypotheses for 
these measures are equal.  
6.1.1 Sequence Numbers 
Sequence number 0 only contains funds with no follow-on funds. Hence, we expect them to 
perform worse than funds with higher sequence numbers. This coincides with the finding of 
Chung et al. (2012), that high performing funds are more likely to have a follow-on fund. 
Harris, Jenkinson & Stucke (2014) also find that well-performing funds, in most cases, seem 
to raise new, well-performing funds. There may of course be several reasons, but we do believe 
that performance is an important decision factor when considering raising a follow-on fund. 
The same arguments holds for sequence number 1. To create a follow-on fund, the first fund 
usually performs well. Hence, we believe that sequence number 1 outperforms all other 
sequence numbers.  
Looking at sequence number 0&1, our view depends on the number of observations in 
sequence number 0 and 1. An overweight of observations in sequence number 0 indicates that 
few follow-on funds are raised. Hence, we believe performance among first-time funds are 
poor. However, should there be an overweight of sequence number 1, we believe the opposite 
will happen. Comparing 0&1 against sequence number 2, 3 and 4, Kaplan & Schoar (2005) 
find that first-time funds perform worse than funds with higher sequence numbers. A factor 
pulling in the other direction is the experience and skills of those GPs that has managed to 
raise follow-on funds. Based on theory and our own opinion, we expect that the lack of 
experience will make first-time funds underperform. 
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Comparing sequence number 2, 3 and 4, we expect there to be an upwardly trend due to 
increased experience, and the fact that poor-performing GPs will not be able to raise follow-
on funds. This will in turn weed out poor performers, and we should be left with a higher share 
of skilled GPs managing funds with higher sequence numbers. 
6.1.2 Fund Characteristics 
6.1.2.1 Fund types 
To compare buyout and venture funds, we need to take a closer look at their investments. The 
most notable difference between them is the characteristics of the companies invested in. In 
the buyout industry, portfolio companies are often well established, while the venture industry 
is packed with young companies and entrepreneurs looking to enter the markets. We believe 
there are greater risk involved in the venture industry, as far from all venture-backed 
companies succeed in their pursuit of success. Thus, venture funds might experience more 
cyclical returns, and in our opinion underperform compared to buyout funds. 
6.1.2.2 Cycles 
Looking at cycles, boom periods are much longer than bust periods. Returns in general are 
higher during boom periods, enabling funds that are active in more years of high economic 
growth, to gain higher returns. In addition, during bust periods, prices tend to fall. Hence, 
funds raised in bust periods make their investments at lower prices, increasing chances of 
greater returns. Obviously, funds raised at the start of a boom period will experience much of 
the same effects and have many of the same characteristics. This could possibly reduce the 
differences between periods. However, we still believe that funds raised in bust periods will 
perform better than funds raised in boom periods. 
6.1.2.3 Decades 
Comparing decades, we look at key events during the 90s and the 00s. As mentioned earlier, 
reporting of PE performance have improved over the last decades. If there is systematic 
overstatement of returns in the 90s, we believe there is an upward bias in the 90s compared to 
funds raised in the 00s. Due to cheaper financing and a general growth in PE during the 00s, 
the industry has been more accessible in recent years. An increase in demand from LPs could 
potentially lead to more funds being raised just to fill this demand, favouring quantity over 
quality. Hence, we expect returns to be higher in the 90s. 
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The recessions from the 1990 until 2008, play a big part in explaining the differences between 
fund types during different decades. Leading up to the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, 
most venture-backed companies experienced enormous growth. We would at least expect 
venture funds raised in the early 90s to perform well, and therefore outperform buyout funds 
in this decade. While the venture industry took some time to recover after the recession, the 
buyout industry benefited from a long buyout boom in the 00s. We thus believe that buyout 
outperform venture in the 00s. Both the long boom period during the 90s and the buyout boom 
in the 00s, have contributed in generating good returns for buyout funds. Hence, we find it 
hard to expect differences in performance across decades. Due to the dot-com bubble in the 
late 90s and early 00s, we expect venture funds raised in the 90s to outperform venture funds 
raised in the 00s. 
6.1.2.4 Size 
Gompers & Lerner (2000) find that larger firms seem to pay a higher price for their 
investments. By being large, it may be easy to grasp over too much, being less concerned about 
the price of an investment. When comparing fund sizes, this implies that smaller firms have 
better performance. Also, Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find that successful GPs chose not to grow 
as much as less successful. However, larger funds have a greater possibility to diversify their 
investments, reducing the amount of unsystematic risk. Although we do not think differences 
in size influence performance too much, we favour smaller funds over larger. 
Metrick & Yasuda (2010) find that buyout funds are more scalable than venture funds. This is 
mainly due to advantages concerning debt financing, but we also believe there is another 
reason. Controlling venture-backed companies demand huge resources, mainly human skills. 
By investing in too many companies, GPs would not be able to use the necessary amount of 
time and dedication to fulfil each investment’s potential. Hence, we believe most venture funds 
perform better when smaller. Looking at buyout funds, Metrick & Yasuda find that some 
buyout funds expand rapidly, favouring short-term income from fees over quality. This points 
towards better performing, smaller buyout funds. Comparing fund types on sizes, we would 
expect insignificant differences among small funds, but expect the differences to increase with 
larger funds. 
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6.2 Size 
6.2.1 Sequence Numbers 
Looking at sequence numbers, we expect performance and time to be the main factors 
affecting size. First, well-performing GPs tend to attract more investors, increasing fund sizes 
as they raise follow-on funds. This implies that fund size increases with sequence number. 
However, if a follow-on fund is raised only a year or two after the first, investors may not be 
able to see how the first is performing. Hendershott (2008) also points out that a fund needs at 
least four years to be able to predict, with 50% certainty, that a fund with interim top quartile 
performance will finish in the top quartile. Hence, a follow-on fund may not be larger than its 
predecessor.  
Second, we have seen a general growth in the economy, and expect the PE industry to follow 
the same path. Given that the industry grows faster than the inflation, we expect fund size to 
be positively correlated with sequence number. Thus, our hypothesis is that size increases by 
each sequence number. Sequence number 0 and 1 are exceptions here, as they both are a GP’s 
first fund and we expect them to be the same size. 
6.2.2 Fund Characteristics 
6.2.2.1 Fund Types 
We mentioned that buyout funds are more scalable than venture funds, implying they might 
be larger. Since we also expect venture funds to benefit from being smaller, our prediction is 
that buyout funds in general are larger than venture funds. 
6.2.2.2 Cycles 
The size of funds depend heavily on when they are raised. LPs may be less willing to invest 
money in bust periods as investors usually become more cautious during recessions. Thus, we 
believe that funds raised in boom periods are larger. 
6.2.2.3 Decades 
The PE industry has evolved over the last two decades. With a bigger interest in the asset class 
now than earlier, more capital is being invested, possibly leading to larger funds in recent 
 37 
years. However, the 00s have experienced two bust periods, implying funds in the 00s may 
not be that large. We believe the former argument is stronger, though, thus expecting funds 
raised in the 00s to be larger than funds raised in the 90s. 
Looking at fund types, the venture boom during the 90s would imply better venture 
performance. As performance increases, demand increases, possibly increasing fund sizes. 
However, we do believe that buyout funds are large due to the scalability of the fund type. 
Hence, we expect small differences in sizes during the 90s. 
Although most of the 90s was a period of high economic growth, there was a big buyout boom 
in the 00s. Combined with the growth in the PE industry over time, we believe buyout funds 
will be larger in the 00s compared to the 90s. The strong venture performance in the 90s makes 
us believe that venture funds are larger in this decade. 
6.3 Quartile and Past Performance Persistence  
There is a possibility that a GP in the top quartile in one period got there because of luck. Also, 
a proportion of skilled GPs will have their funds outside of the top quartile because of bad 
luck. We would therefore expect, looking one period back at a GPs’ last fund quartile 
performance, it is not a very significant indicator of the current fund’s performance. However, 
we expect that this becomes more significant if we look back several periods. 
Robert Hendershott (2008) has suggested that GPs need three or four previous funds in the top 
quartile to be able to predict top quartile performance for their next fund. Hendershot used VE 
as a data source, and although this dataset has been found to exhibit weaknesses, we expect 
the results from Preqin’s database to give similar results. Our expectations are therefore that a 
previous period’s quartile rank is not a significant indicator of next fund’s performance. 
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7 Methodology 
7.1 Statistical tests 
To be able to perform the analyses  done in this thesis, we have run a series of tests using both 
Microsoft Excel and Stata. The main test used is the t-test, but we also make use of the MWW-
test. 
7.1.1 Student’s t-test for two independent samples  
The t-test is used to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the means 
of two independent groups on a continuous dependent variable. The dependent variable will 
in this thesis be either IRR, size or TVPI. All these variable are measured at a continuous level, 
even though one could argue that the upper range of these variables is in fact infinitely.  
There are two possible formulas that can be used when computing the t-test. One is run if we 
assume equal sample variances (Formula XXX), and another is run if the variances are unequal 
(Formula XXX). The t-test assuming equal variances is given by 
 
𝑡 =
?̅? − ?̅?
(
(𝑛𝑥 − 1) × 𝑠𝑥2 + (𝑛𝑦 − 1) × 𝑠𝑦2
𝑛𝑥 + 𝑛𝑦 − 2
)
1
2⁄
(
1
𝑛𝑥
+
1
𝑛𝑦
)
1
2⁄
 
 
(7) 
and the t-test assuming unequal variances is given by 
where 𝑡 is the test score, ?̅? and ?̅? are the averages of the first and second sample, respectively, 
𝑛𝑥 and 𝑛𝑦 are the number of observations for the first and second sample, and 𝑠𝑥
2 and 𝑠𝑦
2 are 
the variances for the first and second sample.  
If the test is significant, we reject the null hypothesis of equal population means in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis of difference in population means. In order to perform the t-test, five 
different assumptions need to be met. There needs to be: 
 
 
𝑡 =
?̅? − ?̅?
(
𝑠𝑥2
𝑛𝑥
+
𝑠𝑦2
𝑛𝑦
)
1
2⁄
 
 
(8) 
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1. One independent variable consisting of two categorical, independent groups. 
2. Independence of observations. 
3. No significant outliers in the two groups in terms of the dependent variable. 
4. Approximate normal distribution for the dependent variable for each of the two groups. 
5. Homogeneity of the variances for the two groups. 
 
If the third assumption is violated, it could have a large influence on the mean and standard 
deviation for the group, thus affecting the test results. The outlier problem is more severe if a 
sample size is small. To mitigate this problem we have trimmed the dataset to remove extreme 
values for IRR, size and TVPI. Whenever the t-test is applied to our analysis, we only used 
the trimmed dataset.  
Even though the fourth assumption should be upheld in order to get proper test results, the t-
test is somewhat robust to violations. Therefore, the data only needs to be approximately 
normally distributed, and because of the central limit theorem, the validity of the results 
increases as the sample size increases. If a sample size is small, the t-distribution is a poor 
approximation to the t-statistic if we are dealing with non-normality. However, as sample size 
increases, the estimator will satisfy asymptotic normality. There are no general consensus as 
to how big a sample size must be before the approximation is good enough, but a general rule 
of thumb is 30 observations (Wooldridge, 2014).  
A potentially bigger problem than a non-normal distribution, is non-homogeneous skewness 
in the distributions of the two samples. A violation of the fifth assumption becomes more 
severe the bigger the difference is between the sample sizes in each group. If the sample sizes 
are similar, a violation is often not that serious.  
7.1.2 Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon 
The MWW-test is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test and is more efficient if the data is 
non-normal. If we find, after evaluating the data, that neither performance metric is very 
normal nor particularly symmetric, the MWW-test will be a more appropriate way of 
comparing different characteristics in our data. The first two assumptions for the t-test also 
applies to the MWW-test. The test is used to check whether there are differences in the 
distributions of two groups, or differences in the medians of two groups, and is given by 
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𝑧 =
?̅? − 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑈𝑥, 𝑈𝑦)
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?)
 
 
(9) 
where 𝑧 is the test score, ?̅?is the mean 𝑈-score for the two samples and min(𝑈) is the lowest 
of the two 𝑈-scores for the two samples. 𝑈 is given by 
 
𝑈𝑥,𝑦 = 𝑛𝑥,𝑦 × 𝑛𝑦,𝑥 +
𝑛𝑥,𝑦 × (𝑛𝑥,𝑦 + 1)
2
− 𝑅𝑥,𝑦 
 
(10) 
where 𝑈 is the 𝑈-score, 𝑛 is the number of observations in a sample and 𝑅 is the rank sum for 
a sample. 𝑅 is the sum of all the ranks for a given sample.  
The MWW-test works by ranking each score of the dependent variable according to size, and 
without consideration to which group it is in. The ranks obtained for the two samples are then 
averaged and tested for differences. A numerical example is given in Appendix I. 
As mentioned, the MWW-test interpret whether there is a difference in the distributions of two 
groups or if there is a difference in the medians of two groups. Which test is carried out is 
dependent on the distribution of scores for both groups of the independent variable. This in 
turn leads to two possible alternative hypotheses: 
HA1: The medians of the two groups are unequal 
HA2: The mean ranks of the two groups are unequal 
If we consider the first alternative hypothesis, we are testing if the medians are different for 
the two groups. This is more in line with the t-test, which does the same for sample means, 
and assumes that the shape and dispersion of the distributions are similar. In presented tables, 
this type of analysis will be indicated by subscript 1 (MWW1). 
If we consider the second alternative hypothesis, we are testing for differences in distributions. 
We would here be interested in whether the performance of sample 1 and sample 2 are similar, 
or if one sample is significantly different from the other. The MWW-test does this by 
comparing the mean ranks of each distribution. In presented tables, this type of analysis will 
be indicated by subscript 2 (MWW2). 
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7.2 Test Selection Process 
Below is a flowchart that describes the selection process used for deciding between the 
parametric t-test and the non-parametric MWW-test. We start by using the trimmed dataset, 
as this is the basis for the t-test. The first thing we need to check is whether the samples are 
normally distributed or not. To do this, we use the skewness and kurtosis test for normality 
(SK-test). The SK-test is given by 
 𝐾2 = 𝑍1
2 + 𝑍2
2 (11) 
Where 𝐾2 is the test score and 𝑍1
2 and 𝑍2
2 is the distribution of the test statistic for skewness 
and kurtosis, respectively. 𝐾2 has an approximately 𝑥2 distribution with two degrees of 
freedom. If  𝐾2 is significant, the null hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected in favour 
of the alternative hypothesis of a non-normal distribution. In the case where both samples are 
normally distributed, the t-test will be used. However, before the t-test is run, we need to check 
whether the variances of the two samples are equal or not. This is done using the F-test for 
two samples variances (sdtest), which is given by 
 
𝐹 =
𝑠𝑥
2
𝑠𝑦2
 
 
(12) 
where F is the test score and 𝑠𝑥
2 and 𝑠𝑦
2 are the variances of the first and second sample, 
respectively. If F is significant, the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis of unequal variances.  
Should the samples show non-normal distributions, we need to check the number of 
observations in each sample. As mentioned earlier, the t-distribution is a poor approximation 
to the t-statistic if we are dealing with non-normality and a small sample size. We choose to 
use 50 observations as a lower limit, and all samples with less observations are generally ruled 
out for the t-test. However, we do study all samples carefully. Should some of those samples 
with less than 50 observations show very clear signs of being eligible for the t-test through our 
skewness tests, the t-test will be used.  
We use three different ways of looking at skewness for samples with more than 50 
observations, determining whether they are fit for the t-test or not, even though the samples 
are not normally distributed. Firstly, we see if the distributions are similarly skewed, simply 
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by looking at the skewness coefficient. Secondly, we use the SK-test to determine if both 
distributions are significantly skewed. Thirdly, we take a closer look at the distributions 
(graphically) to double check that they show the same as the two former tests. When deciding 
if the samples are fit to be used in the t-test, some subjective choices are made. We try as best 
we can to make the right calls, but there is always the possibility that two samples should have 
been compared using the MWW-test instead. If the data fails to meet the criteria of the t-test, 
we will use the MWW-test and switch to the untrimmed dataset. 
The final step of the process is to 
see if the samples have a similar 
shape. If they are similar, we can 
make an inference based on the 
medians of the two samples, 
whereas if they are dissimilar, we 
are limited to make an inference 
based on the distributions of the 
two samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Statistical Test Selection Flow Chart 
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8 Findings 
In this section, we look at the effects of the different fund characteristics on IRR, size and 
TVPI. The main characteristic is fund type, and sequence number, cycles, decades and size 
will be controlled for both individually, and in combination with the main characteristic. 
Because of relatively few observations concerning quartile data, at least when we look back 
more than one period, quartile ranks and a discussion around them will be done separately.  
8.1 IRR and TVPI 
IRR and TVPI are two performance measures that will not show very different results given 
that the underlying characteristics are similar. We choose to use IRR when presenting this 
analysis and then comment if TVPI displays a different result. 
8.1.1 Sequence Numbers 
We see from Table XXX that all other sequence numbers show strong6, significant differences 
from sequence number 0. Hence, we can say that sequence number 0 has a significantly lower 
distribution than all other funds. Consequently, it is adjacent to believe that GPs with sub-par 
performance close operations either straight away, or because they do not get the funding 
necessary to raise follow-on funds. 
Sequence number 1 (12.47%) has the highest return of all sequence numbers. The results are 
weakly significant compared to sequence number 2 and 4. This is not surprising, as it is mostly 
GPs with the best performing first funds that raises a follow-on fund. Looking at TVPI, the 
result is strongly significant compared to fund number 4. 
We find somewhat different results than Kaplan & Schoar (2005) looking at first-time funds 
(10.71%). While they find that first-time funds perform worse than funds with higher sequence 
number, our results point towards the opposite. Sequence number 0&1 has a higher 
performance compared to sequence number 2, 3 and 4, however, none of these results are 
                                                 
6 0.01 ≥ p-value = strongly significant. 0.01 < p-value ≤ 0.05 = significant. 0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.1 = weakly significant. 
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significant. This is surprising, as we would expect that when sequence numbers increase, sup-
performing GPs would be weeded out, and thus leave us with a larger share of skilled GPs. 
Comparing sequence number 2 (8.70%), 3 (10.16%) and 4 (9.46%), we find no significant 
differences between any of them. All results for sequence numbers seem to suggest that 
experience is not necessarily a contributing factor for good results. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) 
find that “GPs of higher sequence number funds are better able to survive the poor 
performance of one particular fund(source)”, which may help us explain the somewhat 
surprising results. 
8.1.2 Fund Characteristics 
8.1.2.1 Fund Types 
We find that buyout funds clearly outperform venture funds, averaging an IRR of 13.32% and 
7.27%, respectively (Table 12 and 14). The result is strongly significant and coincides with 
the findings of Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003), Robinson & Sensoy (2011) and Harris, 
Jenkinson, & Kaplan (2014). As the two latter papers also have similar sample periods, the 
result is not surprising. Some of the other papers find that venture outperforms buyout. 
However, they do have little data after 2000, and as we will see later on, venture funds have 
not performed well during the 00s. 
8.1.2.2 Cycles 
As we hypothesised, funds raised in bust periods have a higher IRR (12.76%) and outperform 
funds raised in boom periods (9.18%). The result is significant, and in line with the finding of 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005). They find evidence that funds raised in periods of high economic 
growth are less likely to create follow-on funds. In our opinion, this implies lower performance 
for funds raised in boom periods. Barber & Yasuda (2010) find that fundraising often start 
when interim performances of GPs’ existing funds are peaking. We believe these peaks usually 
happens during boom periods, thus implying our results are similar. 
Comparing cycles on buyout, the median IRRs of funds raised in boom and bust periods, are 
11.10% and 17.00%, respectively. This result is strongly significant, but looking at TVPI, the 
result is not significant at all, leading us to assume that the duration of funds raised in a bust 
period is smaller than for funds raised in a boom period. Without access to cash flow data, we 
have no way of confirming or rejecting this assumption. Venture funds raised in boom periods 
 45 
average an IRR of 6.71% compared to those raised in bust periods that average 10.03%. The 
difference is weakly significant. 
Comparing fund types on cycles, buyout clearly outperforms venture in boom periods. This is 
strongly significant. In bust periods, however, we can only tell that the distribution of buyout 
performance is larger than that of venture. This result, too, is strongly significant. A closer 
look at IRR and TVPI for these funds, all suggest that buyout funds outperform venture funds 
when raised in bust periods. 
8.1.2.3 Decades 
We find that funds raised in the 90s clearly outperform funds raised in the 00s. Having an IRR 
of 12.11% and 7.87%, respectively, the result is strongly significant. Higson & Stucke (2012) 
find a downward trend in performance looking at vintage returns. Even though this seem to 
coincide with our result, they only study buyout funds. 
When we look at buyout funds and compare decades, we find higher performance in the 00s 
(14.07%) than in the 90s (12.52%). Although the result is not significant, it does not show a 
downward trend in buyout performance over the years. This coincides with Harris, Jenkinson 
& Kaplan’s (2014) study. In addition to finding high performance for buyout funds throughout 
both decades, they also report significant differences in venture fund performance. We find an 
average IRR of 11.78% for venture funds raised in the 90s, and an IRR for funds raised in the 
00s at 4.20%. The difference is strongly significant, and as mentioned earlier, we believe this 
is mainly due to the effects of the dot-com bubble. 
Looking at different cycles and comparing fund types, we see that there is no significant 
difference between buyout and venture in the 90s. However, the difference in the 00s is 
strongly significant, which is expected, given the results mentioned above. 
8.1.2.4 Size 
Last, we compare sizes. Small, medium and large funds have an IRR of 10.68%, 9.85% and 
8.82%, respectively. None of these performance metrics are significantly different from each 
other, but looking at TVPI, medium funds perform better than large funds. This difference is 
weakly significant. These results do not match those of Kaplan & Schoar (2005). They find 
that larger funds perform better than small. Robinson & Sensoy (2011) also find a somewhat 
different relationship between performance and size, namely that it is concave. 
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However, both Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003) and Gompers & Lerner (2000) find results 
suggesting higher performance for smaller funds. Although our results are not significant, we 
have similar findings. The results of the latter study indicates that larger funds pay higher 
prices for their investments, thus performing worse than smaller funds. 
Taking a closer look at buyout funds, we can see that there are no significant differences in 
performance for any fund sizes. Looking at TVPI, however, we can see that small buyout 
funds have a larger distribution than both medium and large funds, while medium funds 
outperform large funds. Our results clearly contradicts the suggestion of Higson & Stucke 
(2012), who suggest that large buyout funds perform better than small, due to easier access to 
debt financing. Metrick & Yasuda’s (2010) findings that GPs of buyout funds with some 
experience favour quantity over quality, seem to be a plausible explanation. 
For venture funds, there are no significant differences when comparing small and medium 
funds. However, our results show that small funds have a significantly larger distribution than 
large funds. Medium venture funds also outperform large venture funds. These results 
contradicts those of Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan (2014), who find that smaller venture funds 
underperform compared to larger venture funds. Comparing fund types, we can say that small 
buyout funds have a larger distribution than small venture funds with medians of 17.00% and 
6.80%, respectively. This is weakly significant, but for TVPI, the result is strongly significant. 
Looking at medium and large funds, buyout clearly outperform venture funds. These results 
are also strongly significant.   
8.2 Size 
8.2.1 Sequence Numbers 
Our results show that sequence number 0 has a significant lower size distribution than any 
other sequence numbers, except for sequence number 1, where there is no significant 
difference. 
We see that sequence number 1 ($294M) is significantly lower than both sequence number 3 
($401M) and 4 ($526M). These results are not surprising, as we expected funds with higher 
sequence numbers to be larger. Looking at sequence number 0&1 ($309M), we find almost 
 47 
identical results as for sequence number 1. The only difference is that, compared to sequence 
number 3, the difference in size is now only weakly significant. 
Comparing sequence number 2 ($337M) and 3, we find no significant differences. However, 
both these funds are significantly smaller than sequence number 4. The results show that 
sequence number 4 is significantly larger than all other sequence numbers. Knowing that 
sequence number 4 also contain funds with higher sequence numbers, this is not surprising. 
Metrick & Yasuda’s (2010) finding, that GPs in buyout funds with experience sharply increase 
the size of their funds, is in line with our results. 
8.2.2 Fund Characteristics 
8.2.2.1 Fund Types 
Looking at fund types, buyout ($545M) is significantly larger than venture ($306M). Again, 
the finding mentioned in the former paragraph by Metrick & Yasuda (2010), supports this. 
Higson & Stucke’s (2012) suggestion that buyout funds are more scalable, also backs this 
result. In addition, we believe that venture funds benefit from being smaller. Hence, the result 
is not surprising. 
8.2.2.2 Cycles 
In our hypothesis, we believe that funds raised in boom periods would be larger than funds 
raised in bust period due to cautious investors. The results show that boom ($406M) is only 
fractionally larger than bust ($386M), however, this is not significant. In retrospect, we may 
have based our hypothesis on investors’ behaviour in a too generalised way. Institutional 
investors might be less cautious than non-professionals about investing in bust periods. They 
have longer investment horizons and may see a market correction as an opportunity. A longer 
horizon may also enable them to sit through economic downturns. 
Our results also show that buyout funds raised in boom periods are larger than buyout funds 
raised in bust periods. With a median of $456M and $269M, respectively, the difference is 
weakly significant. Looking at venture funds, we find the opposite, although the result is not 
significant. Comparing fund types, we can see that buyout funds are significantly larger than 
venture in boom periods. Looking at bust periods, we can only say that the distribution of 
buyout funds is significantly larger than that of venture funds. This indicates that more 
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investors turn to venture funds in bust periods. If investors, too, believe that venture returns 
are more cyclical, there is a huge potential upside to these investments when prices are low. 
8.2.2.3 Decades 
A closer look at decades tells us that funds raised in the 00s ($413M) are a fraction larger than 
funds raised in the 90s ($390M). This result is not significant and does not coincide completely 
with the findings of Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan (2014). They find that on average, fund sizes 
increase independent of fund types. Considering the growth of the PE industry over the last 
decades, our results implies that there are a lot more funds in the 00s. We wrote in our 
hypothesis that this result was possible, and argued that two bust periods in the 00s could be 
the reason why. However, looking at the results concerning size and cycles, this does not seem 
to be the case. Another possible explanation may be that GPs do not want to invest in too many 
companies, as it would be harder to be equally dedicated to all of them. Hence, funds do not 
need to be any larger than earlier. 
Comparing decades, we see that buyout funds are somewhat larger in the 90s. It does not seem 
like the buyout boom in the 00s have had that big of an impact on the size of buyout funds. 
We find that the average decrease for buyout funds from the 90s to the 00s has been 10.5%, 
but using Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan’s (2014) numbers we find an increase of 81.6%. The 
difference is huge, but we do not know whether their numbers are adjusted for inflation, or if 
they have trimmed the dataset for outliers.  
What we find more surprising, though, is that venture funds raised in the 90s ($239M) are 
significantly smaller than venture funds raised in the 00s ($352M). Looking at it in retrospect, 
we see that funds raised in 2000 and in the beginning of 2001, just before the bubble burst, 
may have helped increasing the average of fund sizes in the 00s. Again, looking at Harris, 
Jenkinson & Kaplan’s (2014) study, their numbers suggest an increase in mean, which is much 
bigger than what we find (87.4% vs. 47.2%).  
Comparing fund types on decades, we find that buyout funds have a larger distribution than 
venture in the 90s. In the 00s, buyout is clearly larger than venture. This result is strongly 
significant. 
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8.3 Quartile Data 
There is no statistical difference between a current fund’s performance if a GP’s last fund was 
in the first or second quartile. However, there is a weak significant difference if a GP’s last 
fund was in the top half versus the bottom half. We also see that if a GP’s last fund was in the 
bottom quartile, their current fund perform significantly worse compared to the current funds 
of those GPs who’s last fund was in any of the three higher quartiles. 
Looking at all buyout and venture funds, independent of GP location and region focus, quartile 
results are consistent with those findings we got from US buyout and venture funds. This is 
also true if we look at all funds regardless of GP location and region focus. 
This leads us to believe that picking top performers based on a GP’s last fund, is not possible. 
However, the performance of a GP’s last fund can be used as an indicator of which funds to 
avoid. 
To look for stronger persistence, we need to include data from all buyout and venture funds 
regardless of GP location and region focus, in order to increase number of observations. In the 
two-period case, we compare current fund performance of GPs with two previous consecutive 
top quartile funds, against current fund performance of GPs that that did not have a top quartile 
fund two periods ago. In the three-period case, we compare current fund performance of GPs 
with three previous consecutive top quartile funds, against current fund performance of GPs 
that that did not have a top quartile fund two or three periods ago. 
In the two-period case, the consecutive top performers perform statistically better than the 
current fund of GPs with their last fund in the second quartile or below. In the three-period 
case, the current fund of consecutive top performing GPs delivers significantly better results 
than the current fund of GPs that only have their last fund in the top quartile, but none of their 
previous funds ranked top quartile. They also perform better than GPs with their last fund in 
the second, third or fourth quartile. 
However, this is only true if we look at IRR. If TVPI is used as the performance metric, the 
three-period case is less significant than the two-period case. In addition, we cannot claim that 
the current fund of consecutive top performers is statistically different from the current 
performance of GPs with their last fund in the first or second quartile. 
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This is a little surprising, but has two possible reasons. Either there are too few observations, 
or, because the IRR is the main factor in the construction of quartile ranks, it might make it 
unsuitable for inferences about TVPI persistence. 
The results seem to be in line with the conclusions of Hendershott’s (2008) study. If there is 
roughly a 40% probability that a fund in the top quartile is being followed by another top 
quartile fund, this is above the 25% of funds that would have been able to follow a top quartile 
fund if it followed a random selection. Hendershott argues that this is because there is a higher 
amount of exceptionally able GPs present in the top quartile. We therefore expect the 
probability, that a GP with two or more consecutive top quartile funds raise a new top quartile 
funds, to be more than 40%.  
Looking deeper into this, we restrict our data to GPs with more than one sequence number and 
corresponding quartile rank. We look at the chances that the next fund is top quartile given 
that a GP has had consecutive top quartile funds. As the number of past top quartile funds 
increases, we expect the chance to increase. We also look at the chances of beating the 
benchmark, achieving an IRR above the top quartile return of all observations in our data set 
(20.1%) and the chance of achieving a positive return.  
The analysis show that chances for a GP’s next fund to be ranked in the top quartile increase 
with the number of consecutive top quartile performances. The chances are 35%, 41% and 
59% (See Appendix H), depending on how many top performing funds a GP has had. These 
results are similar to those found by Hendershott (2008). We also see that as the number of 
consecutive top performances increase, so does the likelihood of beating the benchmark IRR 
and the chance of achieving a positive return.  
8.3.1 General Note on Persistence 
A potential problem with linking past performance to future performance is that it does not 
take in to account the risk profiles of GPs. A venture fund focusing on new technology or early 
stage pharmaceutical companies might on average deliver greater returns than venture funds 
focusing on retail or distribution. The former is potentially more risky and thus increases the 
risk of a fund, run by GPs with superior abilities, falling outside the top quartile rank. 
The same is true for buyout. If some buyout GPs consistently use more leverage than others 
with similar abilities, the former strategy may on average generate higher returns, however, it 
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is also more risky. This leads us to assume that a choice of consecutive top performers in a PE 
investment portfolio can be used as a way of reducing risk, more so than an effective way of 
picking top performers. 
8.4 Data points outside our sample 
After running our tests, and considering previous studies on the field, we ran some additional 
tests to see if the inferences from our study could be generalised to the whole PE investment 
universe. We focused on whether there was a significant difference between performance for 
funds focusing on investing in the US and funds with other countries or regions as their main 
focus area. Later we compared results from US buyout and venture funds to the other fund 
types also covered in the original dataset.  
8.4.1 Regions 
By focusing on different regions, we classified the different focus areas into continents in order 
to increase observations. Due too generally few observations and non-normal data, we ran the 
MWW-test to see if there were any differences in distributions. Of the six continents we 
examined, only Oceania and South America had significantly different distributions than the 
US. We can see from this that funds with a focus in these two continents deliver significantly 
better results than funds focusing on the US market alone. 
Looking closer at Oceania, we see an overweight of small funds (58%) compared to the US 
[22%]. We also see an overweight of buyout funds (38%) [21%] and funds with sequence 
number 1 (31%) [21%]. Oceanian venture funds make up 27% [33%] of the total fund types. 
Since we have found that Oceania have more funds with characteristics associated with high 
performance, it is not surprising that funds focusing on this continent outperform the US. 
If we look closer at South America there is significant differences if we use TVPI as our 
performance metric. If IRR is used it is not significantly different from the US. We would 
expect this insignificance to be due to the lack of observations, but we cannot be certain that 
this is the case. 
From Table we see that the fund size dispersion is fairly similar to the US, only with a slightly 
higher tendency towards small funds (32%) [22%]. We find a substantial overweight of funds 
started in the 00s looking at South American funds (89%) [61%]. This should have led to a 
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lower performance, since the 90s outperform the 00s in the main analysis. However, the same 
macroeconomic factors may not apply to this region. 
Looking at fund types, there is a low representation of venture funds, but a substantial 
overweight of infrastructure (21%) [1%] and growth funds (37%) [2%] focusing on this 
region. We find no evidence that these funds deliver different returns compared to buyout and 
venture. However, there is a possibility that the economic conditions in this region makes these 
fund types more suitable. Looking deeper into the data, we find that most growth funds 
underperform compared to the South American median (1.74) with five out of seven funds 
being below the median. If the US median is used [1.45] three out of seven are still below. 
However, all infrastructure and buyout funds perform better than the US median and all 
infrastructure funds also perform better than the US median. This leads us to believe that 
infrastructure and buyout is highly suited for this area, but growth funds cannot help us explain 
the difference. A closer description of continent fund composition is found in Appendix G. 
8.4.2 Fund Types 
After going through all fund types, we only find that distressed debt and natural resources 
deliver significantly better results than buyout and venture funds. This is only considering 
IRR, though. If we use a one-sided MWW-test and look at TVPI, natural resources are not 
statistically different from US buyout and venture funds. The two-tailed test is inconclusive 
with a p-value of 1.2484. We find the same with distressed debt, which returns a p-value of 
1.8525. These probabilities should not be possible, but with the way Microsoft Excel, and 
most statistical software calculates two-tailed tests, this might happen if we have non-
symmetric distributions (Kulinskaya, 2008). 
If we look more closely at these funds, we find that 75% of US distressed debt funds have an 
IRR above the combined buyout and venture median IRR. The equivalent measure for natural 
resources is 85%. Since TVPI is not significantly different for any of these, it leads us to 
believe that the average lifetime of these funds are shorter than those of buyout and venture 
funds. Looking at the cash flow charts available for the funds in question, it does not seem like 
this is the case. However, without full access to all cash flow data, we have no way of 
confirming or rejecting this hypothesis. A closer dicription of fund comparison can be found 
in Appendix G 
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Based on the findings from the data outside our sample, it seems like most of the findings for 
US based buyout and venture, can be generalised to other fund types and other regions. 
However, there is a problem with lack of observations, and a quantitative analysis will 
encounter problems. An in-depth case study might be a better way of researching these less 
explored fund types and regions. 
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9 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have investigated the performance of private equity funds, focusing on the 
buyout and venture sector. We have used a dataset of individual fund returns and 
characteristics form the Preqin database over the period from 1990 to 2008. Most other private 
equity papers have focused on funds raised up until the late 1990s and early 2000s, but the 
recent inflow of capital to this sector has created a need for a re-evaluation of fund and GP 
performance. 
We find that experience and past performance is not necessarily the best determinant for future 
fund performance. It is, however, a likely determinant of future fund size. Based on the growth 
of follow-on funds, the ability of GPs with a higher sequence number to survive a poor 
performing fund, leads to the conclusion that too much weight is being put on past 
performance. Even though our data does not show strong signs of PE persistency, picking GPs 
with strong past performance could be used in a risk reduction strategy. 
Secondly, we find that buyout funds outperform venture funds on a general basis. Actually, 
we find no significant results showing that venture outperform buyout no matter what we 
control for. We believe that this is much due to the buyout boom in the 00s and the fact that 
debt financing has been a lot cheaper in later years.  
Thirdly, there are few differences in our findings when comparing IRR results to TVPI. This 
could indicate that there are no systematic underlying factors, or timing differences, that affect 
the two fund types. Hence, the IRR is, on average, a reliable performance metric. 
Fourthly, we find that our results can be generalised to most parts of the PE investment 
universe. Most regions perform similar to the US, and if there is a discrepancy, it is mostly 
because of the difference in fund composition. There might be some differences due to 
legislation, but this is outside the scope of our thesis and will need further research. We also 
find that most funds, on average, emulate the return characteristics of buyout and venture 
combined. The only discrepancies here are natural resources and distressed debt. We cannot 
find any particular reason for this due to lack of data.  
We find that our results using the Preqin dataset show similar results to more recent studies 
on private equity, especially those using the Burgiss dataset. Few papers have focused 
specifically on sequence numbers. The paper from Kaplan & Schoar (2005) is one of the few 
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that have focused on this, but the study is now ten years old and the VE dataset has been shown 
to exhibit some weaknesses. Our thesis includes some results on sequence numbers, but a more 
in-depth study of sequence numbers could highlight some important characteristic of specific 
GPs behaviour, enabling LPs to pick better PE funds in the future. As the Preqin dataset lends 
itself to easy sequence number calculations, this would be a great way of expanding the 
knowledge of PE performance.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics for Trimmed Dataset 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics for IRR - Trimmed Dataset - All mean and 
median numbers are in percentages 
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 668 271 397 567 101 292 376 127 360 181
Mean 9.73 13.32 7.27 9.18 12.76 12.11 7.87 10.68 9.85 8.82
Median 8.65 12.00 5.00 8.20 11.40 9.65 7.85 8.90 8.10 8.90
Std Error 0.55 0.72 0.75 0.60 1.35 0.96 0.61 1.40 0.77 0.87
Observations 177 89 88 155 22 95 82 57 87 33
Mean 10.71 12.66 8.74 9.86 16.69 11.90 9.33 12.67 9.22 11.24
Median 10.00 11.50 8.70 9.70 14.00 9.70 10.05 12.00 9.30 10.70
Std Error 1.01 1.27 1.55 1.04 3.32 1.54 1.24 2.08 1.28 2.22
Observations 39 14 25 33 6 23 16 15 16 8
Mean 4.46 8.64 2.13 4.03 6.87 5.44 3.06 7.33 3.33 1.36
Median 2.90 5.90 1.40 2.20 4.00 3.90 0.45 7.10 2.40 -2.10
Std Error 2.07 4.02 2.24 2.36 3.70 2.96 2.78 4.21 2.58 3.75
Observations 138 75 63 122 16 72 66 42 71 25
Mean 12.47 13.41 11.36 11.44 20.37 13.97 10.84 14.58 10.55 14.40
Median 10.70 11.70 9.70 10.55 15.25 11.60 10.60 12.40 10.00 12.10
Std Error 2.09 3.02 2.99 2.15 6.57 3.08 1.33 2.35 1.41 2.38
Observations 159 72 87 138 21 72 87 37 90 32
Mean 8.70 12.25 5.76 7.95 13.61 8.91 8.53 8.66 9.61 6.17
Median 7.70 11.65 3.50 7.50 11.40 7.00 8.20 7.00 9.50 7.25
Std Error 2.04 3.03 2.62 2.18 5.41 3.11 1.14 2.17 1.45 1.47
Observations 110 47 63 85 25 47 63 17 66 27
Mean 10.16 16.11 5.72 10.22 9.96 12.53 8.39 8.41 9.18 13.64
Median 8.90 15.40 3.90 8.90 9.40 9.20 8.90 8.90 7.15 14.40
Std Error 2.24 2.60 3.02 2.59 4.40 3.27 1.57 4.21 1.78 1.90
Observations 222 63 159 189 33 78 144 16 117 89
Mean 9.46 13.40 7.90 9.07 11.73 15.07 6.43 10.63 10.87 7.41
Median 7.50 12.10 4.80 6.40 11.60 10.80 5.95 3.60 7.70 8.20
Std Error 2.51 3.61 3.25 2.78 5.74 4.03 1.03 4.99 1.59 1.30
Descriptive Statistics for IRR
3
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
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Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics for Size – Trimmed Dataset - All mean and 
median numbers are in million USD 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics for TVPI - Trimmed Dataset 
  
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 668 271 397 567 101 292 376 127 360 181
Mean 403 545 306 406 386 390 413 58 259 931
Median 266 402 204 271 252 239 277 57 245 803
Std Error 15 28 16 17 39 24 20 2 6 30
Observations 177 89 88 155 22 95 82 57 87 33
Mean 309 448 169 316 259 283 340 56 215 995
Median 171 264 108 178 92 162 172 57 194 844
Std Error 29 50 23 32 77 35 49 3 10 78
Observations 39 14 25 33 6 23 16 15 16 8
Mean 363 675 188 377 285 263 507 54 185 1298
Median 119 375 108 120 78 104 120 52 137 1339
Std Error 85 182 65 95 190 76 173 6 27 167
Observations 138 75 63 122 16 72 66 42 71 25
Mean 294 405 162 300 249 289 299 57 222 897
Median 182 264 108 191 97 191 174 57 206 756
Std Error 29 48 20 31 83 40 43 4 10 81
Observations 159 72 87 138 21 72 87 37 90 32
Mean 337 484 216 347 272 358 320 61 266 859
Median 245 395 163 245 252 231 267 58 249 725
Std Error 26 45 23 29 48 43 32 3 12 64
Observations 110 47 63 85 25 47 63 17 66 27
Mean 401 612 243 415 353 410 394 57 277 921
Median 289 486 170 299 243 288 290 55 254 779
Std Error 37 59 36 45 56 62 45 6 15 84
Observations 222 63 159 189 33 78 144 16 117 89
Mean 526 701 456 518 570 539 519 65 276 937
Median 383 570 335 380 435 367 407 62 262 858
Std Error 28 62 29 30 87 54 33 6 10 40
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
3
Descriptive Statistics for Size
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 668 271 397 567 101 292 376 127 360 181
Mean 1.56 1.77 1.42 1.53 1.71 1.65 1.49 1.59 1.59 1.47
Median 1.46 1.68 1.27 1.45 1.53 1.50 1.41 1.47 1.45 1.48
Std Error 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04
Observations 177 89 88 155 22 95 82 57 87 33
Mean 1.62 1.75 1.49 1.57 2.00 1.64 1.60 1.72 1.57 1.59
Median 1.58 1.71 1.45 1.52 1.83 1.58 1.57 1.72 1.47 1.53
Std Error 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.12
Observations 39 14 25 33 6 23 16 15 16 8
Mean 1.24 1.40 1.14 1.22 1.30 1.30 1.14 1.36 1.20 1.08
Median 1.12 1.43 1.05 1.10 1.14 1.16 1.01 1.34 1.11 0.89
Std Error 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.18
Observations 138 75 63 122 16 72 66 42 71 25
Mean 1.73 1.82 1.63 1.66 2.26 1.75 1.71 1.84 1.66 1.75
Median 1.64 1.77 1.59 1.60 2.08 1.71 1.63 1.77 1.63 1.64
Std Error 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.13
Observations 159 72 87 138 21 72 87 37 90 32
Mean 1.53 1.74 1.36 1.48 1.88 1.51 1.55 1.49 1.59 1.41
Median 1.46 1.67 1.22 1.44 1.75 1.45 1.51 1.35 1.52 1.43
Std Error 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.08
Observations 110 47 63 85 25 47 63 17 66 27
Mean 1.62 1.90 1.40 1.63 1.57 1.74 1.52 1.54 1.60 1.70
Median 1.44 1.88 1.17 1.48 1.38 1.54 1.39 1.32 1.39 1.69
Std Error 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.24 0.12 0.10
Observations 222 63 159 189 33 78 144 16 117 89
Mean 1.50 1.73 1.41 1.50 1.53 1.73 1.38 1.47 1.59 1.39
Median 1.38 1.54 1.28 1.36 1.46 1.51 1.34 1.24 1.40 1.34
Std Error 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.07
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
3
Descriptive Statistics for TVPI
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Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics for Untrimmed Dataset 
 
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics for IRR - Untrimmed Dataset - All mean and 
median numbers are in percentages 
 
 
Table 7 - Descriptive Statistics for Size - Untrimmed Dataset - All mean and 
median numbers are in million USD 
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 786 305 481 671 115 364 422 176 398 212
Median 8.60 11.60 5.10 8.30 11.30 9.90 7.70 7.75 8.60 8.85
Mean 12.80 12.55 12.96 12.91 12.17 19.62 6.91 11.72 15.75 8.16
Std Error 1.20 0.88 1.88 1.37 1.64 2.39 0.75 2.21 2.08 0.96
Observations 208 94 114 183 25 113 95 80 94 34
Median 9.70 11.25 7.70 9.60 11.60 9.70 9.70 9.70 9.15 11.10
Mean 10.80 11.36 10.34 10.36 14.04 14.05 6.94 10.60 10.67 11.63
Std Error 1.84 1.58 3.11 2.04 3.40 2.90 2.04 3.24 2.92 2.19
Observations 51 16 35 43 8 29 22 25 18 8
Median 0.00 4.40 -2.20 -1.70 4.00 2.20 -3.55 1.40 1.10 -2.10
Mean -1.14 3.34 -3.18 -1.90 2.98 4.08 -8.00 -1.00 -2.44 1.36
Std Error 3.98 5.25 5.29 4.64 4.73 5.35 5.75 7.42 4.57 3.75
Observations 157 78 79 140 17 84 73 55 76 26
Median 11.60 11.90 10.10 10.70 15.00 11.60 10.70 13.00 10.05 12.15
Mean 14.68 13.00 16.34 14.12 19.24 17.49 11.44 15.87 13.78 14.79
Std Error 1.98 1.52 3.65 2.17 3.94 3.38 1.71 3.09 3.36 2.32
Observations 181 79 102 154 27 84 97 46 96 39
Median 7.50 11.30 3.35 7.40 11.40 8.20 7.50 6.30 9.50 7.50
Mean 11.55 12.25 11.01 11.23 13.40 17.34 6.54 11.13 13.38 7.55
Std Error 2.35 1.70 3.97 2.69 3.66 4.76 1.35 4.46 3.74 2.66
Observations 128 51 77 102 26 59 69 25 71 32
Median 8.75 14.40 3.90 8.75 9.00 9.20 8.60 8.90 7.20 11.55
Mean 12.34 14.99 10.59 13.23 8.85 18.28 7.27 14.21 12.53 10.47
Std Error 2.45 1.53 3.95 3.02 2.35 4.89 1.61 6.48 3.64 2.58
Observations 269 81 188 232 37 108 161 25 137 107
Median 7.80 12.00 5.25 7.65 11.60 11.20 6.00 3.40 9.00 7.00
Mean 15.40 12.69 16.57 15.89 12.34 27.96 6.98 13.87 22.57 6.58
Std Error 2.51 1.98 3.50 2.87 3.37 5.85 1.12 5.45 4.66 1.26
3
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
Descriptive Statistics for IRR
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 786 305 481 671 115 364 422 176 398 212
Median 252 447 178 257 226 227 273 56 236 884
Mean 477 780 285 490 401 441 508 54 254 1249
Std Error 26 59 16 30 48 34 39 2 5 74
Observations 208 94 114 183 25 113 95 80 94 34
Median 140 262 83 143 82 134 147 54 188 871
Mean 287 459 145 295 231 248 333 52 212 1050
Std Error 29 54 19 31 69 31 51 3 9 94
Observations 51 16 35 43 8 29 22 25 18 8
Median 104 273 83 111 58 83 114 57 140 1339
Mean 295 606 153 309 222 223 391 54 184 1298
Std Error 67 166 47 75 145 62 131 5 24 167
Observations 157 78 79 140 17 84 73 55 76 26
Median 162 262 82 172 97 153 169 47 200 788
Mean 285 429 142 291 235 257 316 50 218 973
Std Error 31 56 17 34 79 36 53 4 10 109
Observations 181 79 102 154 27 84 97 46 96 39
Median 224 415 146 229 224 221 245 57 245 779
Mean 398 622 225 390 445 437 364 59 259 1141
Std Error 42 81 33 42 150 65 55 4 11 139
Observations 128 51 77 102 26 59 69 25 71 32
Median 257 542 164 276 228 258 257 53 249 799
Mean 443 776 222 469 339 500 394 49 270 1134
Std Error 53 110 31 65 56 99 49 5 14 153
Observations 269 81 188 232 37 108 161 25 137 107
Median 371 764 294 367 415 325 441 57 260 963
Mean 694 1309 429 720 529 613 748 54 270 1385
Std Error 61 173 29 69 80 80 86 6 9 126
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
3
Descriptive Statistics for Size
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Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics for TVPI - Untrimmed Dataset 
 
  
Sequence Number Statistics All Buyout Venture Boom Bust 90s 00s Small Medium Large
Observations 786 305 481 671 115 364 422 176 398 212
Median 1.46 1.66 1.28 1.46 1.51 1.52 1.40 1.41 1.46 1.48
Mean 1.84 1.75 1.89 1.86 1.72 2.22 1.51 2.02 1.96 1.45
Std Error 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.25 0.11 0.04
Observations 208 94 114 183 25 113 95 80 94 34
Median 1.56 1.70 1.45 1.52 1.67 1.58 1.53 1.60 1.47 1.54
Mean 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.73 1.86 1.76 1.73 1.82 1.73 1.62
Std Error 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.12
Observations 51 16 35 43 8 29 22 25 18 8
Median 1.00 1.23 0.90 0.90 1.14 1.10 0.83 1.05 1.05 0.89
Mean 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.17 1.46 0.95 1.40 1.09 1.08
Std Error 0.22 0.17 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.38 0.13 0.44 0.14 0.18
Observations 157 78 79 140 17 84 73 55 76 26
Median 1.69 1.77 1.60 1.64 1.93 1.72 1.64 1.81 1.64 1.67
Mean 1.91 1.85 1.97 1.88 2.19 1.86 1.97 2.02 1.88 1.78
Std Error 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.23 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.13
Observations 181 79 102 154 27 84 97 46 96 39
Median 1.46 1.65 1.19 1.42 1.65 1.48 1.40 1.32 1.52 1.45
Mean 1.77 1.71 1.82 1.73 1.97 2.12 1.47 2.20 1.71 1.41
Std Error 0.22 0.08 0.38 0.25 0.28 0.46 0.07 0.81 0.13 0.09
Observations 128 51 77 102 26 59 69 25 71 32
Median 1.46 1.80 1.17 1.53 1.38 1.56 1.38 1.32 1.39 1.67
Mean 1.92 1.86 1.95 2.02 1.53 2.41 1.49 2.23 1.94 1.61
Std Error 0.20 0.09 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.41 0.10 0.56 0.30 0.10
Observations 269 81 188 232 37 108 161 25 137 107
Median 1.40 1.55 1.33 1.39 1.46 1.55 1.35 1.21 1.46 1.34
Mean 1.91 1.72 1.99 1.96 1.59 2.66 1.41 2.07 2.31 1.36
Std Error 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.06 0.47 0.25 0.06
4
All
0&1
0
1
2
3
Descriptive Statistics for TVPI
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Appendix C – Sequence Number Comparisons 
 
Table 9 - Sequence Number Comparisons for IRR 
 
 
Table 10 - Sequence Number Comparisons for Size 
 
SN IRR (%) Observations P-value Test
0 0.00 51
1 11.60 157
0 0.00 51
2 7.50 181
0 0.00 51
3 8.75 128
0 0.00 51
4 7.80 269
1 12.47 138
2 8.70 159
1 12.47 138
3 10.16 110
1 12.47 138
4 9.46 222
0&1 10.71 177
2 8.70 159
0&1 10.71 177
3 10.16 110
0&1 10.71 177
4 9.46 222
2 8.70 159
3 10.16 110
2 8.70 159
4 9.46 222
3 10.16 110
4 9.46 222
T-test
T-test
T-test
Sequence Number (SN) Comparisons by IRR
T-test
T-test
T-test
T-test
T-test
MWW2
MWW2
MWW2
MWW2
T-test
0.7392
0.3934
0.3758
0.5992
0.6951
0.0004
0.0123
0.1804
0.0502
0.1606
0.0000
0.0012
0.0005
SN Size $M Observations P-value Test
0 104 51
1 162 157
0 104 51
2 224 181
0 104 51
3 257 128
0 104 51
4 371 269
1 294 138
2 337 159
1 294 138
3 401 110
1 294 138
4 526 222
0&1 309 177
2 337 159
0&1 309 177
3 401 110
0&1 309 177
4 526 222
2 337 159
3 401 110
2 337 159
4 526 222
3 401 110
4 526 222
0.0000 T-test
0.0097 T-test
0.0532 T-test
0.0000 T-test
0.1586 T-test
0.0219 T-test
0.0000 T-test
0.4769 T-test
0.0001 MWW2
0.0000 MWW2
0.2700 T-test
Sequence Number (SN) Comparisons by Size
0.1198 MWW2
0.0007 MWW2
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Table 11 - Sequence Number Comparisons for TVPI 
  
SN TVPI Observations P-value Test
0 1.00 51
1 1.69 157
0 1.00 51
2 1.46 181
0 1.00 51
3 1.46 128
0 1.00 51
4 1.40 269
1 1.73 138
2 1.53 159
1 1.73 138
3 1.62 110
1 1.73 138
4 1.50 222
0&1 1.62 177
2 1.53 159
0&1 1.62 177
3 1.62 110
0&1 1.62 177
4 1.50 222
2 1.53 159
3 1.62 110
2 1.53 159
4 1.50 222
3 1.62 110
4 1.50 222
0.2305 T-test
0.1270 T-test
0.3954 T-test
0.7130 T-test
0.0074 T-test
0.2650 T-test
0.9621 T-test
0.0005 MWW2
0.0216 T-test
0.2662 T-test
0.0000 MWW1
0.0006 MWW2
0.0003 MWW2
Sequence Number (SN) Comparisons by TVPI
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Appendix D - Fund Characteristic Comparisons 
 
Table 12 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons by IRR 
 
 
Table 13 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons by Size 
 
 
Table 14 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons by TVPI 
  
FC IRR (%) Observations P-value Test
Buyout 13.32 271
Venture 7.27 397
Boom 9.18 567
Bust 12.76 101
90s 12.11 292
00s 7.87 376
Small 10.68 127
Medium 9.85 360
Small 10.68 127
Large 8.82 181
Medium 9.85 360
Large 8.82 181
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons by IRR
0.0000 T-test
0.0190 T-test
0.0002 T-test
0.5914 T-test
0.2605 T-test
0.3768 T-test
FC Size $M Observations P-value Test
Buyout 545 271
Venture 306 397
Boom 406 567
Bust 386 101
90s 390 292
00s 413 376
0.0000 T-test
0.6478 T-test
0.4667 T-test
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons by Size
FC TVPI Observations P-value Test
Buyout 1.77 271
Venture 1.42 397
Boom 1.53 567
Bust 1.71 101
90s 1.65 292
00s 1.49 376
Small 1.59 127
Medium 1.59 360
Small 1.59 127
Large 1.47 181
Medium 1.59 360
Large 1.47 181
0.1659 T-test
0.0648 T-test
0.0297 T-test
0.0098 T-test
0.9600 T-test
0.0000 T-test
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons by TVPI
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Appendix E - Fund Type Comparisons on Fund 
Characteristics 
 
Table 15 - Fund Type Comparisons on Fund Characteristics by IRR 
 
 
Table 16 - Fund Type Comparisons on Fund Characteristics by Size 
 
 
Table 17 - Fund Type Comparisons on Fund Characteristics by TVPI 
FC FT IRR (%) Observations P-value Test
Buyout 12.63 237
Venture 6.71 330
Buyout 17.00 37
Venture 6.65 78
Buyout 12.52 131
Venture 11.78 161
Buyout 14.07 140
Venture 4.20 236
Buyout 17.00 25
Venture 6.80 151
Buyout 13.56 137
Venture 7.57 223
Buyout 12.15 112
Venture 3.41 69
0.0001 T-test
90s
00s
Small
Large
Medium
0.0000 T-test
0.6915 T-test
0.0000 T-test
0.0616 MWW2
Fund Type (FT) Comparisons on Fund Characteristics (FC) by IRR
0.0000 T-test
0.0001 MWW2
Boom
Bust
FC FT Size $M Observations P-value Test
Buyout 558 237
Venture 267 330
Buyout 269 37
Venture 179 78
Buyout 462 148
Venture 148 216
Buyout 516 140
Venture 352 236
Fund Type (FT) Comparisons on Fund Characteristics (FC) by Size
Boom 0.0000 T-test
Bust 0.0168 MWW2
90s 0.0000 MWW2
00s 0.0001 T-test
FC FT TVPI Observations P-value Test
Buyout 1.75 237
Venture 1.38 330
Buyout 1.77 37
Venture 1.36 78
Buyout 1.73 131
Venture 1.58 161
Buyout 1.80 140
Venture 1.30 236
Buyout 2.15 25
Venture 1.32 151
Buyout 1.80 137
Venture 1.46 223
Buyout 1.66 112
Venture 1.17 69
Boom 0.0000 T-test
0.0000 T-test
0.0073 MWW2
0.0001 T-test
0.0027 MWW1
0.1317 T-test
Fund Type (FT) Comparisons on Fund Characteristics (FC) by TVPI
Bust
90s
00s
Small
Medium
Large 0.0000 T-test
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Appendix F - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Fund 
Type 
 
Table 18 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Buyout by IRR 
 
 
Table 19 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Buyout by Size 
 
 
Table 20 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Buyout by TVPI 
 
FC IRR (%) Observations P-value Test
Boom 11.10 237
Bust 17.00 37
90s 12.52 131
00s 14.07 140
Small 17.00 25
Medium 12.25 137
Small 17.00 25
Large 11.10 112
Medium 13.56 137
Large 12.15 112
0.3310 T-test
0.3732 MWW2
0.1608 MWW2
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Buyout by IRR
0.0028 MWW1
0.2875 T-test
FC Size $M Observations P-value Test
Boom 456 268
Bust 269 37
90s 576 131
00s 516 140
0.2774 T-test
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Buyout by Size
0.0551 MWW1
FC TVPI Observations P-value Test
Boom 1.63 268
Bust 1.77 37
90s 1.73 131
00s 1.80 140
Small 2.15 25
Medium 1.69 142
Small 2.15 25
Large 1.58 138
Medium 1.80 142
Large 1.66 138
0.0113 MWW2
0.0998 T-test
0.3891 T-test
0.0862 MWW2
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Buyout by TVPI
0.1496 MWW1
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Table 21 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Venture by IRR 
 
 
Table 22 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Venture by Size 
 
 
Table 23 - Fund Characteristic Comparisons on Venture by TVPI 
 
  
FC IRR (%) Observations P-value Test
Boom 6.71 330
Bust 10.03 67
90s 11.78 161
00s 4.20 236
Small 9.20 105
Medium 7.57 223
Small 6.80 151
Large 0.25 69
Medium 7.57 223
Large 3.41 69
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Venture by IRR
T-test
T-test
T-test
MWW2
T-test
0.3850
0.01914
0.0153
0.0994
0.0000
FC Size $M Observations P-value Test
Boom 297 330
Bust 354 67
90s 239 161
00s 352 236
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Venture by Size
T-test
T-test
0.2687
0.0002
FC TVPI Observations P-value Test
Boom 1.38 330
Bust 1.61 67
90s 1.58 161
00s 1.30 236
Small 1.48 105
Medium 1.46 223
Small 1.32 151
Large 1.01 74
Medium 1.46 223
Large 1.17 69
T-test
MWW2
T-test
0.0193
0.0005
Fund Characteristic (FC) Comparisons on Venture by TVPI
T-test
T-test
0.0293
0.0013
0.8422
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Appendix G – Data Outside our Sample 
 
Table 24 - Continent Comparison by Type, Size, Decade, Sequence 
Number and Cycle 
US Oceania S America
Type Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
Balanced 17 1 % 1 4 % 0 0 %
Buyout 305 21 % 10 38 % 3 16 %
Co-investment 4 0 % 1 4 % 0 0 %
Distressed Debt 36 2 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Fund of Funds 92 6 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Growth 36 2 % 1 4 % 7 37 %
Infrastructure 11 1 % 0 0 % 4 21 %
Mezzanine 64 4 % 0 0 % 1 5 %
Natural Resources 34 2 % 1 4 % 0 0 %
Real Estate 351 24 % 4 15 % 3 16 %
Secondaries 4 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Special Situations 12 1 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Timber 7 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Turnaround 4 0 % 1 4 % 0 0 %
Venture 481 33 % 7 27 % 1 5 %
Size
Small 320 22 % 15 58 % 6 32 %
Medium 731 50 % 9 35 % 9 47 %
Large 403 28 % 2 8 % 4 21 %
Decade
90s 570 39 % 10 38 % 2 11 %
00s 888 61 % 16 62 % 17 89 %
Sequence Number
0 70 5 % 3 12 % 0 0 %
1 301 21 % 8 31 % 9 47 %
2 317 22 % 5 19 % 6 32 %
3 221 15 % 4 15 % 2 11 %
4 549 38 % 6 23 % 2 11 %
Cycle
Boom 1237 85 % 23 88 % 14 74 %
Bust 221 15 % 3 12 % 5 26 %
Data Outside Our Sample - Continent Comparison
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Table 25 - Comparison of Fund Types Outside Our Sample 
  
Fund Type Obs Median P-Value Test Median P-value Test
Buyout & Venture 786 8.6 1.46
Balanced 17 13.1 0.2543 MWW2 1.85 1.3799 MWW2
Co-investment 4 6.6 0.9553 MWW2 1.355 0.9641 MWW2
Distressed Debt 36 16.6 0.0040 MWW2 1.56 1.8525 MWW2
Fund of Funds 92 8.8 0.3402 MWW2 1.45 1.4240 MWW2
Growth 36 10.4 0.3608 MWW2 1.665 1.8303 MWW2
Infrastructure 11 14.4 0.4361 MWW2 1.62 1.0940 MWW2
Mezzanine 64 9.55 0.8152 MWW2 1.38 0.7978 MWW2
Natural Resources 34 20.55 0.0000 MWW2 1.835 1.2484 MWW2
Real Estate 351 9.3 0.5801 MWW2 1.4 0.0937 MWW2
Secondaries 4 10.65 0.6580 MWW2 1.5 0.8917 MWW2
Special Situations 12 10.15 0.6204 MWW2 1.565 1.4628 MWW2
Timber 7 1.9 0.1047 MWW2 1.42 0.8985 MWW2
Turnaround 4 6.8 0.9562 MWW2 1.305 0.6328 MWW2
Comparrisons of All Fund Types
IRR TVPI
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Appendix H – Quartile Tables 
 
Table 26 - Comparison of Consecutive Top Performing GPs 
 
Table 27 - Comparison of Last Funds’ Quartile Performance by Included 
Datapoints 
IRR Last Funds Quartile Rank
1st Quartile Count Median Mean Std Error Conf Int 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 period 147 10.9 26.6626 4.7906 9.3895 0.2618 0.0108 0.0000
2 perods 36 20.05 42.3028 14.5717 28.5599 0.1240 0.0171 0.0041 0.0000
3 periods 11 23.3 31.5000 10.2913 20.1705 0.0901 0.0288 0.0151 0.0008
TVPI Last Funds Quartile Rank
1st Quartile Count Median Mean Std Error Conf Int 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 period 147 1.67 2.5281 0.2679 0.5250 0.1789 0.0035 0.0000
2 perods 36 2.19 3.1994 0.6677 1.3086 0.1435 0.0247 0.0021 0.0000
3 periods 11 2.28 2.2755 0.3840 0.7525 0.3115 0.1118 0.0329 0.0032
Top Quartile in Consecutive Periods: All Buyout and Venture
IRR 2nd 3rd 4th TVPI 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.3630 0.0169 0.0000 1st 0.3437 0.0132 0.0000
2nd 0.0736 0.0000 2nd 0.1079 0.0000
3rd 0.0013 3rd 0.0010
IRR 2nd 3rd 4th TVPI 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.2618 0.0108 0.0000 1st 0.1789 0.0035 0.0000
2nd 0.1013 0.0000 2nd 0.1079 0.0000
3rd 0.0024 3rd 0.0026
IRR 2nd 3rd 4th TVPI 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.9672 0.0268 0.0000 1st 0.7250 0.0539 0.0000
2nd 0.0065 0.0000 2nd 0.0910 0.0000
3rd 0.0001 3rd 0.0000
IRR 2nd 3rd 4th TVPI 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.7692 0.0131 0.0000 1st 0.5220 0.0166 0.0000
2nd 0.0124 0.0000 2nd 0.0662 0.0000
3rd 0.0001 3rd 0.0001
US Buyout and Venture Funds  - Last Funds' Quartile Performance
All Buyout and Venture Funds - Last Funds' Quartile Performance
US All Funds - Last Funds' Quartile Performance
All Funds - Last Funds' Quartile Performance
Comparison of Last Quartile Rank for Different Characteristics
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Table 28 - Percentage of Next Funds in Top Quartile based on Top Quartile 
Persistance 
 
Table 29 - Percentage of Next Fund Beating Benchmark, Top Quartile and 
Gaining Positive Results by Top Quartile Persistance 
  
Top Quartile in Obs Next Top
1 period 886 34.88 %
2 periods 193 40.93 %
3 periods 49 59.18 %
Next Fund Top Quartile Chance
Top quartile in Obs Benchmark 20.1 0
1 period 356 59.27 % 33.43 % 90.37 %
2 periods 78 62.82 % 35.90 % 90.45 %
3 periods 25 80.00 % 56.00 % 93.94 %
Percentage of Funds With An IRR Above
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Appendix I – MWW-test A Numerical Example 
 
Table 30 - MWW test - A numerical example 
In the two leftmost columns in Table 30, we have two samples showing the heights (cm) of 
10 men and 10 women. In the “Ranks” columns, we have given each observation, independent 
of samples, a rank in an ascending order. As we see from the table, the lowest (163 cm) out of 
the 20 observations has gotten the rank 1, and the tallest (193 cm) has gotten the rank 20. In 
the event of equal observations, also called a tie, the average rank for the two observations 
will be assigned both of them. By summing the ranks, the rank sum (R) is found for each 
sample. Now that the R is found, utilising Formula 9 and 10 will give the test score.  
Male Female Male Female Male Female
179 165 12 2.5 n 10 10
186 171 17.5 7 Median 182.5 170.5
165 180 2.5 13 Rank sum 140.5 69.5
193 163 20 1 U 14.5 85.5
189 172 19 8
182 169 15 5 U - min 14.5
177 170 10 6 Mean U 50
183 168 16 4 Variance 175
186 173 17.5 9 Std dev 13.23
178 181 11 14 z-score -2.6835
Data samples Ranks
MWW-test - Numerical Example
Statistics
